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Notes
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.:

The Federal Circuit Awards Damages
for Harm Done to a Patent not in Suit
I. INTRODUCTION.

Intellectual properties, such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights,
are big business in the United States.' Part of their allure is that they
provide a government-sanctioned means of excluding competitors
from particular market niches by allowing the holder of a property to
exclusively market and sell a product.2 Additionally, if a competitor
trespasses into a protected niche by, for instance, infringing the property and diverting sales from the owner, ihe owner may seek injunctive
relief as well as an award of monetary damages caused by the infringement.
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., ("Rite-Hite ,,)3 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit4 sitting en banc ruled that the Patent
Code 5 allowed a patentee, Rite-Hite, to recover as damages lost profits
caused by lost sales of its devices, which competed with devices that
infringed its patent. 6 This ruling, characterized by the court as a matter
of first impression, 7 upheld an award of damages for lost sales of Rite1. Ronald B. Coolley, Overview and Statistical Study of the Law on Patent Damages,
75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 515, 517 (1993) (citing patent damages awarded as
totalling more than $1.7 billion dollars in 152 published cases from 1982-92); Gary M.
Ropski & Marc S. Cooperman, Damages in USA Intellectual Property Litigation, 72 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 181, 181-82 (1990) (citing specific awards of $200
million for patent damages, nearly $20 million for trademark damages, and $2 million
for copyright damages).
2. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151
(1989) (noting that 'free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection
of a federal patent is the exception").
3. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc) [hereinafter Rite-Hite], cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
184 (1995).
4. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a court with exclusive jurisdiction
over patent appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994) [hereinafter Federal Circuit]. Congress
established the Federal Circuit on October 1, 1982 by enacting the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(2)). See infra note 140.
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994). See infra note 81 for the damages section of the
Patent Code.
6. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1543.
7. Id. at 1548 n.7.
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Hite's cross-competing devices that were not protected by the patent in
suit.8
The Rite-Hite decision thus replaced the requirement common to tort
actions: that the defendant should be liable for its tortious conduct, but
only for the foreseeable consequences of that conduct. 9 Specifically,
under tort law, a plaintiff can recover damages only for injuries that
meet a two-step test: (1) "but for" the wrong, the injury would not
have occurred;' ° and (2) the wrong proximately caused the injury." In
Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit held that "but for" the infringement, RiteHite would have sold more goods, and lost sales to the infringing
goods. 2 Further, the court found that the infringement proximately
caused the lost sales of Rite-Hite's
goods, even though they were not
3
protected by the patent in Suit.1
The majority of the Rite-Hite court first examined the phrase
"damages adequate to compensate" the patentee, prescribed by section
284 of the Patent Code. 4 The court explained that this phrase must be
interpreted expansively to cover a large variety of injuries, in order to
make the patentee whole. 5 These compensable injuries now include
lost profits from lost sales of goods competing with the infringing
goods, if6 these competing goods are allegedly protected by some other
patent.1
By interpreting the damages statute this expansively, the Federal
Circuit exceeded its authority "to bring uniformity to the law" in ignoring established law regarding patents.' 7 On the other hand, the major8.

Id. at 1542.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 281
(5th ed. 1984). "In so far as the defendant is held liable for consequences which do not
lie within the original [reasonably foreseeable] risk which the defendant has created, a
strict liability without fault is superimposed upon the liability that is logically to be
attributed to the negligence itself." Id.
10. KEETON, supra note 9, § 41, at 266 (stating that "[tihe defendant's conduct is a
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct") (emphasis
added).
I I. KEETON, supra note 9, § 42, at 273 (explaining that "[tihe term 'proximate cause'
is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined considerations which limit
liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established").
12. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1548-49.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1545 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
15. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text
(detailing the court's analysis of lost profits in Rite-Hite).
16. Id. at 1548-49. See infra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
17. Id. at 1578 (Nies, J., dissenting). See Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Introduction, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 2109, 2110 (1995) (explaining that "[t]he [Federal Circuit] court takes a case
in banc [sic] only when there is a conflict in precedent or if the question presented is of
9.
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ity clarified its earlier holdings regarding the application of the Entire
Market Value Rule. 18 The Federal Circuit held that Rite-Hite could not
recover lost sales of a package containing an unpatented device as well
as a patented device because the two types of devices did not make up
a single functional unit.' 9
This Note first reviews the system of patents and their enforcement
in the United States. 20 Next, this Note surveys the remedies, both
legal and equitable, available to a patent owner whose patent is infringed, 2' and specifically reviews the statutory provisions for damages.22 This Note then examines the standards of proof for awarding a
reasonable royalty23 and for awarding lost profits. 24 Next, this Note25
reviews what injuries are compensable under the patent statutes.
Specifically, this Note considers case law relating to compensation for
lost sales of competitive goods 26 and for collateral or convoyed
goods.27
This Note then discusses the facts and opinions of Rite-Hite, paying
particular attention to the court's analysis of liability and damages.28
This Note reviews the Federal Circuit majority opinion29 and the dissents written by Judge Nies 30 and Judge Newman. 3' This Note then
analyzes Rite-Hite in the context of the patent damages statute and
related precedent. 32 Next, this Note discusses the implications of RiteHite for patentees seeking recovery of damages from lost sales of
such exceptional importance that it warrants attention by the full court"); Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, S.Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. II, 15 (stating that creating the Federal Circuit will "produce
desirable uniformity in this area of the law").
18. Rite-Hite, 56 F. 3d at 1549-51. The Entire Market Value Rule is usually applied
when a device has both patented and unpaterited components, but the patented portion
substantially creates the value of the device. 8 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB I11,
LIPSCOMB'S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 27:35 (3d ed. 1989). See also infra part II.C.2 (discussing the
Entire Market Value Rule).
19. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549-51.
20. See infra part II.A.
21. See infra part Il.B.1.
22. See infra part II.B.2.
23. See infra part I.B.2.a.
24. See infra part lI.B.2.b.
25. See infra part II.C.
26. See infra part II.C.I.
27. See infra part II.C.2. For a definition of convoyed sales, see infra note 142.
28. See infra part III.
29. See infra part IlI.B.I.
30. See infra part lll.B.2.a.
31. See infra part lll.B.2.b.
32. See infra part IV.

668

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

competing goods not protected by the patent in suit, as well as from
convoy sales of other goods sold in conjunction with the patented
goods. 33 Finally, this Note concludes that: (1) the Federal Circuit ignored Supreme Court precedent limiting awards for harm done to patents not in suit and wrongly characterized Rite-Hite as a matter of first
impression, but (2) the Federal Circuit's clarification of the limits conferred by the Entire Market Value Rule provided a needed bright line
rule for the scope of recovery for lost convoy sales.34
II.BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Patent System
The United States system of patents is authorized by the Constitution's mandate that Congress "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 35
Congress has implemented this mandate in several ways over the last
two hundred years, but the current patent statutes allow an inventor to
exclude others from making, using, importing, selling or offering for
sale the patented invention during the entire term of the patent.36 The
current law also requires that, in exchange, the inventor must provide a
description of the invention sufficient to enable others to practice the
invention once the patent's term expires.37
Adjudication of a case or controversy involving a patent usually involves three steps. First, the court determines if the patent is valid.38
Second, the court decides if the patent has been infringed.39 Finally,
the court ascertains what remedies are appropriate to compensate for
the infringement.'
3 3. See infra part V.
34. See infra part VI.
35. U.S. CONST. art 1,§ 8. For a review of the antecedents of this constitutional
provision, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (pts. 1-3), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 697, 849 (1994), 77
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 771, 847 (1995).

36. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he federal patent system thus
embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years").
38. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
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A court begins its analysis by presuming that the patent is valid.4 '
The burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence
rests on the patent's challenger.4 Although this burden is heavy, the
Federal Circuit, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over patent
cases, 43 has found patents invalid in nearly one-third of the cases it has
decided on appeal."4
If a person other than the patentee practices the patented invention
during the term of the patent, then that person is liable as an
infringer. 45 To determine whether a party infringed a patent, courts
examine the list of claims that must be included in a patent.46 A claim
specifically states the particular aspects of an invention that the patentee
claims as unique, and which others may not use.4 1 Claims are sometimes referred to as the "metes and bounds" of the patent, because they
determine when others are trespassing on the property protected by the

41. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-41, 109 Stat. 351, 352
(Nov. 1995). One or all of a patent's claims may be proven invalid as anticipated by or
obvious over the prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994), amended
by Pub. L. No. 104-41, 109 Stat. 352 (Nov. 1995). Prior art "includes any relevant
knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents which pertain to, but predate, invention in
question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Herbert H.
Mintz & Richard B. Racine, Anticipation and Obviousness in the Federal Circuit, 13
AIPLA Q.J. 195 (1985). If the patentee has committed inequitable conduct, the entire
patent may be rendered unenforceable. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1067 (1989).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796
F.2d 443, 446 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987).
43. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
44. Donald R. Dunner et. al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 151, 154-55 (1995). Specifically, in inter
partes proceedings from 1982 to 1994, the Federal Circuit found 158 patents valid under
§ 102, 256 valid under § 103, and 87 valid under § 112, for a total of 501 valid patents.
Id. at 158, 163, and 168. It found 87 patents invalid under § 102, 132 invalid under
§ 103, and 26 invalid under § 112, for a total of 245 invalid patents. Id.
The Federal Circuit has found patents to be unenforceable because of inequitable
conduct 19% of the time. Id. at 173. These numbers, of course, do not measure the
proportion of unappealed judgments; also, they do not measure those patents which are
acknowledged by patentees as invalid or unenforceable before a court becomes involved.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (defining "specification" and "claims"). The patent laws
require that patents include "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id.
47. Id.
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patent.48 Infringement may be literal, i.e., falling exactly within the
claims, 49 or may be found by applying the doctrine of equivalents,
The scope of a patent owner's protection against an infringer is
measured in part by the importance of the invention. Patents may be
divided into two types: pioneer or basic patents, and improvement patents. Pioneer patents generally cover inventions that open up a new
line of technology. 5' Improvement patents, on the other hand, modify
existing technologies.52 A pioneer patent usually provides broader
protection than an improvement patent.5 3 An owner of an improvement patent who does not own the underlying pioneer patent cannot
practice the improvement patent without the authorization of the pioneer patent owner. Similarly, the pioneer patent owner is excluded
from practicing the improvement patent.54
If a patent is found to be valid, enforceable, and infringed, then the
court must determine what remedies are appropriate. A patentee may
be entitled to equitable or legal remedies, or both.55

48. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
49. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
50. For a detailed explanation of this doctrine, see generally Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that
the doctrine of equivalents is used to objectively measure "the substantiality of the
differences between the claimed and accused products or processes"; if the differences are
insubstantial, then the patent is infringed), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996); Gary
M. Hoffman & Eric Oliver, With Hilton Davis the Federal Circuit Takes the Doctrine of
Equivalents Back to Its Roots, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 763 (1995)
(explaining the impact of the Hilton decision on the doctrine of equivalents).
5 1. A "pioneer" patent is "one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct
step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfecting
of what has gone before." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (6th ed. 1990). Compare
with note 52 (defining improvement patent).
52. An improvement patent is defined as "an addition to, or modification of, a
previous invention or discovery, intended or claimed to increase its utility or value."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (6th ed. 1990). Compare with note 51 (defining pioneer
patent).
53. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
54. DONALD S. CHISUM, 4 PATENTS § 16.02[1] (1995). See also Cantrell v. Wallick,
117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886) (stating that "[t]wo patents may both be valid when the
second is an improvement on the first, in which event, if the second includes the first,
neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the other without the
other's consent").
55. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (1994). See infra note 81 for the text of section 284.
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B. Overview of PatentRemedies
1. Available Remedies
Current statutory remedies for utility patent infringement 56 include
injunctive relief, 57 money damages, 8 and, in exceptional cases,
attorney fees59 and costs.60 If the infringement was willful, then the
damages award may be enhanced-up to three times the actual damages. 6 '
The patent statutes do not require that courts grant injunctive relief in
all patent infringement cases.62 If the public interest would be harmed
by an injunction, the court has discretion to refuse to enjoin the
infringement.63 Preliminary injunctions may also be granted in order
to protect both parties. 64 The general rule is that a permanent injunction is required once a patent is found valid and infringed, 65 but
56. There are currently three types of patents: utility patents, described at 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994); design patents, described at 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994); and plant patents,
described at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994). Currently, utility patents comprise the vast
majority of patents that have been issued. See Off. Gaz. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Jan. 2, 1996, at 11, 13, 293, 477, 729 (stating that as of the week of January 2, 1996,
more than 5 million utility patents had been issued, compared with fewer than 400,000
design patents and fewer than 10,000 plant patents). In addition, the Rite-Hite decision
involved a utility patent. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1542; see infra part IlI.A.I. This Note
will therefore focus on damages relating to utility patents.
57. 35 U.S.C. § 283.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See infra part II.B.2. Infringement of copyrights, 17
U.S.C. § 504(a) (1994); trademarks, Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1994);
and design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1994) may also result in an award of infringer's
profits. Attorney fees and costs are also available to owners of these intellectual
properties. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994) (copyright); Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §
117(a) (1994) (trademark); 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1994) (providing that a design patent
owner is not prevented from seeking other remedies).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 285.

60. Id. § 288.
61. Id. § 289.
62. Id. § 283 (instructing courts to "grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity").
63. See Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(refusing to enjoin immediately an apparent infringer when the patentee was not
producing hepatitis test kits), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
A balancing test of four factors indicates whether an injunction is appropriate. The
factors are: (1) likelihood of success, (2) irreparable harm, (3) balance of hardships, and
(4) the public interest. Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir.

1988).
64. See, e.g., Flo-Con Sys., Inc. v. Leco Corp., 845 F. Supp. 1576, 1583-84 (S.D.
Ga. 1993) (ordering the defendant to pay royalties to the court during pendency of the
suit).
65. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir.

1988).
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injunctive relief is available only during the term and to the extent of
the patent.66
2. Damages
Section 284 of the Patent Code provides for damages "adequate to
compensate" for the infringement; this requires at least a "reasonable
royalty., 67 The scope and meaning of the term "damages" in patent
law has been defined through nearly two hundred years of legislation
and case law. 68 During this time, Congress expanded the concept of
damages to include the term "reasonable royalty." 69 A reasonable royalty serves as an alternative to a nominal award when a patent is infringed, but the infringement has not harmed the patentee's sales-for
instance, when the patentee is not practicing the patent.7 °
Statutory provisions for the award of damages for patent infringement have existed since the early 1800s, 7 but the 1870 Patent Act was
the first to allow recovery of monetary and equitable relief in the same
court. 72 The 1870 Patent Act created two types of monetary remedies
that defined the two basic elements of recovery: 73 (1) damages, which
has since been interpreted to include the patentee's lost profits, an

66. See Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(noting that injunctive relief is limited to the extent of the rights in the patent).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See infra note 81 for the text of the statute.
68. See infra notes 69-159 and accompanying text.
69. See infra note 74.
70. See infra part il.B.2.a. It has been suggested that the reasonable royalty is a
replacement of the award of the infringer's profits, removed in the 1946 amendments.
Daniel C. Munson, The Equitable Profits and Reasonable Royalty Remedies-An
Economic Connection, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 887, 889 (1994).
71. See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1876) (reviewing United States
history of statutory patent remedies through 1876); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 515-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (reviewing patent
remedies from 1870 to 1965), aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
870 (1970); DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 PATENTS § 20.02[l] (1995) (reviewing historical
development of remedies for patent holders).
72. Revised Statutes § 4921 (1878). See also Revised Statutes § 4919 (1878)
(providing remedies in cases at law); see generally Munson, supra note 70, at 889-913
(reviewing the historical division of jurisdiction over patent cases between courts of law
and equity).
73. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
"'In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is "profits"; what the owner of the
patent loses by such infringement is "damages.""' Id. (quoting Duplate Corp. v. Triplex
Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach..Co.
v. Brown, 166 F. 306, 306 (2d Cir. 1908)).
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existing royalty, or a reasonable royalty,74 and (2) the infringer's
profits.75
The 1946 amendments to the 1870 Patent Act provided for an award
of "general damages ... not less than a reasonable royalty. 76 The
current provision, "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty," has not been
modified since the 1952 codification of patent law.77 In codifying the
74. The 1870 Act limited monetary relief in § 4921 to "damages" or "profits to be
accounted for by the defendant." Revised Statutes § 4921.
The courts initially interpreted this relief as limited to one of three categories: (I)
profits illicitly gained by the infringer, (2) actual profits lost by the patentee, or (3) an
existing royalty rate. See, e.g., Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (noting
that "established license fees are the best measures of damages that can be used"); Yale
Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 553 (1886) (awarding lost profits caused by
price reduction); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1853) (limiting the
award to infringer's profits in cases where elements two or three cannot be proven).
Eventually, courts recognized that a reasonable royalty could be calculated, even in the
absence of an established royalty rate, with enough certainty to fall within the "actual
damages" proofs, and therefore added the reasonable royalty to the three previously
accepted categories. United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir.
1914). See infra note 83 (defining reasonable royalty).
The reasonable royalty was then codified in the 1922 Act. 42 Stat. 392 (1922). The
infringer's illicit profits were removed as an element of recovery by the 1946
amendments. See infra note 76.
75. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 243 F. Supp. at 517. Despite the conjunctive language of
the pre-1946 statutes, the patentee was not given a double recovery of both profits and
damages because the patentee would then be made more than whole. Mathey v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 694, 697 (D. Mass. 1944). "A patentee in an equity suit
may not recover profits plus damages, but he has the choice of what in substance is the
same, the profits plus any damages in excess thereof." Id.
76. 35 U.S.C. §§ 67, 70 (1946). Section 70, as amended in 1946, reads in relevant
part:
[Ulpon a judgment being rendered in any case for an infringement the
complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be due
compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, not less than a
reasonable royalty therefor, together with such costs, and interest, as may be
fixed by the court. The court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent case.
The court shall assess said damages, or cause the same to be assessed, under
its direction and shall have the same power to increase the assessed damages,
in its discretion, as is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in
actions in the nature of actions of trespass upon the case ....
35 U.S.C. § 70 (emphasis added). These amendments eliminated recovery of the
infringer's profits. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 512. See supra note 70.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See infra note 81 for the full text of the statute. The
1952 Patent Act completely replaced and recodified the patent statutes, last revised in
1870. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, in TITLE 35, U.S.C.A. (1954),
reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161, 163 (1993). Federico, as
Examiner-in-Chief, United States Patent Office, was one of three authors of the 1952

674

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

law, Congress expressed its intent to retain the meaning of "damages"
as defined in the 1946 amendments. 71 In addition, the 1946 amendments, which simply removed infringer's profits from the calculation
of what a patentee could recover, did not affect the definition of damages under pre-1946 law.7 9 Therefore, pre-1946 cases interpreting the
damages provision of the patent statutes remain good law. 80
Section 284 of the Patent Code8 mandates the award of damages

Patent Act. Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 305, 306
(1994). Another of Title 35's authors, Giles S. Rich, became a judge for the now defunct
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and is now a judge sitting on the
Federal Circuit. Id. See also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Rich, J., concurring) (reviewing the development of Title 35's codification).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). The Historical and Revision Notes accompanying § 284
state: "This section consolidates the provisions relating to damages in R.S. 4919 and
4921, with some changes in language." Id. "Section 284 relates to the damages which
may be recovered by a patentee and consolidates provisions in two sections of the old
statute with some changes in language." Federico, supra note 77, at 216.
79. See 69 C.J.S. § 357 (1957) (stating that under the prior statute, "defendant's
profits and complainant's damages were distinct from, and independent of, each other
and were governed by different principles"). See also infra note 80 for examples of post1946 cases relying on pre-1946 interpretations of damages as providing appropriate
definitions of damages.
80. Courts still cite cases defining damages under the 1870 Patent Act. See, e.g., A ro
Mfg., 377 U.S. at 507:
But the present statutory rule is that only "damages" may be recovered. These
have been defined by this Court as "compensation for the pecuniary loss he
[the patentee] has suffered from the infringement, without regard to the
question whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts." They
have been said to constitute "the difference between his pecuniary condition
after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the
infringement had not occurred."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895); Yale
Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)). See also Kori Corp. v. Wilco
Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the
1946 amendments eliminated recovery of infringer's profits, while continuing to allow
the recovery of damages as defined in Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298
U.S. 448, 451 (1936)). See supra note 75.
8 1. The text of 35 U.S.C. § 284 on damages is as follows:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In
either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of
damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.
Id. The section resulted from the consolidation of former §§ 67 and 70. Cf supra note
77. Section 284 has not been amended since 1952.
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for patent infringement, which are calculated in either of two ways.82
Namely, if a patentee can prove lost profits, then the court must award
them. Otherwise, the court will award a reasonable or an actual royalty. 3
a. Awarding a Reasonable Royalty
Until the Federal Circuit affirmed Rite-Hite84 and its companion
case, King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 5 a company which "did not
compete in the sale of its invention in the United States" could receive
only a reasonable royalty rather than lost profits for the infringer's
sales.8 6 A "reasonable royalty may be based upon an established royalty, if there is one, or, if not, upon a hypothetical royalty resulting
from arm's length negotiations between a willing licensor and a willing
licensee."87 In calculating a reasonable royalty, the judge may con82. Unlike the general patent damages statute which provides for an award to the
patentee of "damages adequate to compensate," 35 U.S.C. § 284, the patentee will
recover from the United States "his reasonable and entire compensation" if the United
States unlawfully infringes a patent, copyright, or plant variety certificate. 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a) (1994). Section 1498 was enacted in 1947 and was not part of Title 35's
codification. Id. The provision has been interpreted as requiring fairness, but the court
must "avoid excessive compensation." Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343,
351 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc).
83. "A reasonable royalty is an amount 'which a person, desiring to manufacture and
sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty
and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable
profit."' Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir.
1978) (Markey, C.J., sitting by designation) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)).
84. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 184 (1995).
85. 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Perego I!]. See infra part V.
86. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d
1403, 1406 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Trell v. Marlee Elec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the failure to sell the patented invention in the
United States precludes an award of lost profits).
87. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"'There is, of course, no actual willingness on either side .... '" Id. at 1081 (quoting
Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1159). See also Cincinnati Car Co. v. New York Rapid Transit
Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.)(stating that the willing
licensor/licensee concept is "a device in the aid of justice, by which that which is really
incalculable shall be approximated"); Wesley Kobylak, Factors to Be Considered in
Determining a "Reasonable Royalty" for Purposes of Calculating Damagesfor Patent
Infringement Under 35 U.S.C.S. § 284, 66 A.L.R. FED. 186 (1984) (setting out as the
article's scope relevant portions of § 284 as incorporating case law that recognized
reasonable royalty for measuring damages).
The negotiations are treated as if they occurred on the date the infringement began.
Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1079. If the infringing behavior commenced before the patent
issued, then the negotiations occur on the date the patent was issued because no damages
from infringement may accrue before a patent issues. CHISUM, supra note 54, §
16.04[3]. The pre-issuance profitability may be taken into account by assessing a
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sider several factors, including actual 88 as well as anticipated89 net
profits of the infringer, estimated savings, 9° and expected increases in
sales of unpatented items. 9'
b. Awarding Lost Profits
The prevalent, but non-exclusive, test to determine whether the patentee should be awarded lost profits was described in PanduitCorp. v.
Stahlin Fibre Works, Inc.92 The Panduit test requires the patentee to
show "(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable
non-infringing substitutes [for the patented product], (3) [the] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
amount of the profit he would have made. ' 93
In applying the Panduittest, courts established the type of proof by
which the patentee could satisfy each of these elements.94 Regarding
the first element, a plaintiff can establish demand for the patented product simply by introducing evidence of the infringer's sales. 95 Similarhigher royalty because of the claimed good's established worth. See Wang Lab., Inc. v.
Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
88. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Actual profits are "probative of his anticipated profits." Id.
89. Lindemann, 895 F.2d at 1408. In negotiating a reasonable royalty, alleging that
the infringer would agree to a royalty exceeding its anticipated net profit is "absurd." Id.
90. Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1081.
91. Trans-World Mfg. Corp., 750 F.2d at 1568 (increasing sales of other products
could increase amount of royalties licensee willing to pay). See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Duva
Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (assuming the patented feature creates
consumer demand). If the infringer made, but did not sell, infringing goods, the patentee
still suffers a statutorily recognized harm. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). At least one
commentator has suggested that "an equitable solution would be to award damages on a
reasonable royalty basis." Gary M. Ropski & Marc S. Cooperman, Damages in USA
Intellectual Property Litigation, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 181, 186 (1990).
However, the hypothetical negotiation should not be conducted with the benefit of
hindsight. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1081; TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 899. This
instruction is easier given than implemented. Indeed, the profits earned by the infringer
may be used to determine the measure of a reasonable royalty or as a means of
confirming the patentee's asserted lost profits. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies &
Draglines Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 654-55 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court concluded that what
actually happened is a guide as to what would have happened. Id. at 655.
92. 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, C.J.). Judge Markey, then Chief
Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and future Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit, was sitting by designation. Id. at 1152.
93. Id. at 1156 (citing 3 R. WHITE, PATENT LITIG'ATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS §
9.03(2)). The Panduit test has been approved by the Federal Circuit. Central Soya Co.
v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
94. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
95. Smithkline Diagnostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
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ly, manufacturing and marketing capability may be easily shown by
demonstrating the patentee's ability to subcontract for it. 96 The amount
of lost profits, however, is usually calculated as incremental income
and may be more complicated to prove.97
In contrast, courts have faced difficulty in consistently articulating
the standard for analyzing the second element of the Panduit test,
which requires the absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes for
the patented product. On the one hand, a device protected by a patent
is inherently different from all other devices, and similar devices may
therefore be unacceptable substitutes.98 On the other hand, in some
cases, a device lacking the patented advantage may still constitute an
acceptable non-infringing substitute, unless users specifically want the
patented advantage. 99 However, in all cases, the device proffered as
an acceptable non-infringing substitute must be commercially available.' 00
Additionally, if a third party holds the patent on the proposed substitute, it is presumed to be unavailable to the infringer.' °1 Specifically, if two entities, A and B, own patents for competing devices, and
A's patent is infringed by C, C cannot dispute an award of lost profits
by arguing that B's patented device is an acceptable non-infringing
substitute. This is because A is entitled to a presumption of validity of
B's patent, as well as a presumption that if C had instead practiced B's
patent, C would have been liable to B. °2 C could rebut the presump96. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
97. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
98. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., 788 F.2d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
99. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
SmithKline Diagnostics, 926 F.2d at 1166. If, as in Slimfold, the advantage of the
invention is not particularly desired by purchasers, then the lost profits may be limited
to the value of the advantage, and not based on the lost profits of the entire device.
Slimfold, 932 F.2d at 1459. This award could be considered as based on the difference
between an improvement patent and a pioneer patent. See supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text.
100. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976
F.2d 1559, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
101. State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
102. See McCreary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 141 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1891),
stating:
We do not wish to be understood as expressing an opinion whether, if there
had been an earlier patent for [related devices] outstanding at the date of this
infringement, and owned by a third person, defendant could claim that the
device described in such patent was open to it. In such case it might perhaps
be held that the plaintiff was entitled to stand upon the prima facie validity of
the earlier patent, and that presumptively the defendant would be bound to pay
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tion, however, by showing that B's patent was available to the pub1

lic.

03

While courts apply the Panduittest in most patent damages cases,
courts may, in the alternative, use a second test to determine whether
the patentee should be awarded lost profits." Under this analysis, the
patentee must demonstrate that the market is a two-supplier market,
consisting of the patentee and the infringer.' °5 This demonstration
subsumes the first two elements of the Panduittest, in which the patentee establishes demand and the absence of non-infringing substitutes."° After establishing the two-supplier market, the patentee must
then satisfy the third and fourth Panduitrequirements.'0 7
Both of these tests assume that the patentee and the infringer are
competing in the same market."0 8 Once a patentee satisfies one of
these tests, it may recover lost profits resulting from lost sales, price
erosion or increased advertising costs, which were caused by the infringer's entry into the market.'°9
a royalty to the patentee, and, having elected to make use of the plaintiff's
invention, would be bound to pay a like royalty to him.
Id.
103. State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1579 (approving award of market share of lost profits
when infringer failed to show third party's patent available to practice); Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1539 n.21 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (recognizing that "[i]f,
hypothetically, Rite-Hite had patents covering only the MDL-55 and a third party had
patents covering the ADL-100, Rite-Hite's remedy would be limited to no more than
either (1)a reasonable royalty on the use of the '847 patent or (2) lost profits on the lost
MDL-55 sales"), affd, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
104. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
105. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lam Inc.
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
106 If a customer buys the infringing product, and his only other choice is to
purchase the patentee's product, then the patentee may use the purchase to establish the
demand element, because the customer desired the benefits of the patented product.
Kaufman, 926 F.2d at 1143. In addition, if there are only two competing products, the
patented product and the infringing product, then an acceptable non-infringing
substitute does not exist. Id. at 1142.
107. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). See supra note 93 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the Panduitelements.
108. Bic Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., I F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (reversing lower court's award of lost profits because the infringer did not
compete with the patentee when the infringer's goods were much lower in price than
were the patentee's).
109. Otari, 767 F.2d at 864; Lam, 718 F.2d at 1067. But see Bic Leisure, 1 F.3d at
1220 (finding that other market forces besides infringement caused patentee's lowered
prices). Until Rite-Hite, most patent experts believed that a patentee could receive lost
profits only on lost sales of goods that either directly exploited the patent, or were
convoyed with those goods. See Ropski & Cooperman, supra note 91, at 184. "Awards
of lost profits are appropriate only when the patent owner or an exclusive licensee
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C. CompensablePatent Infringement Injuries
Courts face little difficulty in calculating damages once the patentee
proves the extent of its injuries. What has been less clear, however,
is what injuries trigger compensation under the patent statutes.
1. Competitive Goods
a. United States Supreme Court Cases
Several pre-1946 Supreme Court cases measured the scope of injuries caused by patent infringement that triggered the need for compensation, while two post-1946 cases considered patent damages
under the codified statute.
In McCreary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co.," 0 the Court ruled that,
under the 1870 Patent Act, a patentee could not recover damages
caused by the infringement of a patent not in suit."' In McCreary,the
plaintiff appealed from the lower court's decision not to award damages or profits, despite its holding that the defendant infringed an improvement patent." 2 The patent owner argued that the invention of the
exploits the patent rights directly." Id. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 491
(1854) (remanding for redetermination of damages as an actual royalty instead of lost
profits in light of patent owner's willingness to license every applicant); Trilogy
Communications, Inc. v. Comm Scope Co., 754 F. Supp. 468, 511 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
"The Court has found no authority holding a patentee who does not practice the
invention claimed in its patent is entitled to lost profits from the alleged infringement
of its patents." Id.
110. 141 U.S. 459 (1891). McCreary has been cited in only four reported cases since
1935. See infra note 325.
11I. McCreary, 141 U.S. at 467. The patentee purported to own two patents which
were directed to similar devices for steering and coupling canal boats, but brought suit
under only the later-issued patent. Id. at 461. McCreary predated judicial approval of an
award of a reasonable royalty when patentee's lost profits, infringer's profits, or an
existing royalty could not be proved. See supra note 74.
112. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text for an explanation of
improvement patents. In this case, the difference between the claims of the two patents
"consisted principally in substituting for the projecting cutwater and notch described in
the earlier patent, a chain attached at both ends to one boat, and at its centre to a central
point upon the adjacent end of the other boat." McCreary, 141 U.S. at 464. Thus, the
patent in suit was a modification in the way the two boats were attached. Id.
See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant standards
for determining compensation.
In a one-page opinion, the lower court found
infringement of the only patent in suit, but denied an injunction because an injunction
would cause greater injury to the infringer than benefit to the patentee. McCrary [sic] v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co., 5 F. 367, 368 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880). After finding infringement, the court then ordered a master to render an accounting of the "profits, gains and
advantages which the said defendant has received." McCreary, 141 U.S. at 461. The
master found "no proven profits, savings, or advantages" received by the defendant
from the improvements of the patent in suit over the patent not in suit. Id. The
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earlier patent was not an acceptable alternative in determining damages
because it also owned that patent, and that the defendant therefore "had
no more right to use this invention than the other." ' 3 The Supreme
Court rejected this contention, asserting that the plaintiff could not
raise this argument." 14
To prove its point, the McCreary Court devised a hypothetical situation in which a plaintiff filed suit and, realizing that an acceptable
non-infringing patented technology existed, bought this technology to
preclude the defendant from claiming that it was an alternative available
to the defendant."' The Court noted that such a situation would unfairly force the defendant to pay damages for harm done to a subsequently purchased patent not in suit, because the defendant could never
anticipate being held responsible for damages relating to a subsequently purchased patent." 6
The McCreary Court also analogized to its previous decision in
Seymour v. McCormick." 7 The Seymour Court had limited the award
of damages to include only the improvement patent in suit, and therefore reversed the award of damages caused by the infringement of a
pioneer patent not in suit." 8 McCormick, the patentee, had originally
sued for infringement of two patents, but later dropped the second
patent." 9 The jury awarded "an enormous and ruinous verdict" for
infringer was required to pay only the costs of the suit. Id.
The damages portion of the suit, much like Rite-Hite, took an unusually long time to
resolve-I I years from the finding of infringement of a valid patent to the Supreme
Court opinion affirming the unreported award of no damages. Compare McCreary, 141
U.S. at 459 (decided in 1891) with McCrary, 5 F. at 367 (decided in 1880).
11 3. McCreary, 141 U.S. at 464-65.
114. Id. at 465.
To hold that it had not [that right] is to assume that the plaintiff owned the
earlier patent, that it was a valid patent, and that defendant had infringed it.
This was a question that could not be raised upon an assessment of damages in
this case .... [T]hese were issues which could only be determined upon a bill
framed for this purpose, and could not be made the subject of contest in a
collateral proceeding. For the purposes of this suit the master was bound to
assume that this patent was open to the defendant, otherwise he might be led
into inquiries entirely foreign to the subject of his investigation.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117, 57 U.S. 480 (1853); McCreary, 141 U.S. at 466. Note that no damages were
available in an equity action under the 1836 statute. Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64,
68-69 (1876); CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 20.02[1][d] n. 29. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
118. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 491. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text for
definitions of pioneer and improvement patents.
119. Seymour, 57 U.S. at 485. Both patents were directed to various improvements
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McCormick, as if the patent in suit incorporated the second patent not
in suit. "0 The Seymour Court reversed this award and suggested that
the plaintiff could recover only for the patent in suit. 2 '
The McCreary Court reasoned that if a patentee could not recover
for a patent dropped from a suit under Seymour, a patentee could not
recover for a patent never in suit.' 22 The McCreary Court thus affirmed the lower court's refusal to award damages, finding that.the
patent not in suit must be considered
to be available to the defendant as
23
a non-infringing alternative.
In Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. ConsolidatedSafety Valve
Co., 24 the Supreme Court held that a patentee need not show that it
practiced the infringed patent to be awarded the infringer's profits.' 25
The Court noted, however, that the patentee must have marketed the
goods "embodying
the patented invention" to be entitled to an award of
26
profits.
lost
upon McCormick's original reaper. Id. The patent which remained in suit was directed
to an improvement "whereby a seat for the raker was provided on the machine, so that he
could ride, and not be compelled to walk as before." Id. at 491.
120. Id.
121. Id.
i 22. McCreary, 141 U.S. at 467. The Court declared:
If plaintiff be unable to recover damages for the infringement of a patent
originally included in a suit, but upon which he elects not to proceed, it is
difficult to see how he can recover for the infringement of one not made the
basis of any action at all .... If it be for a different device; then plaintiff could
not recover damages for its infringement without making it the basis of suit.
Id.
123. Id. The consideration of the availability of a patent to be practiced appears to
be a precursor of the Panduit factor, availability of acceptable non-infringing
alternatives. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. "We think, therefore, that
for the purposes of this suit the earlier patent must be deemed open to the defendant, and
no damages having been proved for the infringement of the improvement under the later
patent, considered separately, the finding of the court below was correct." McCreary,
141 U.S. at 467.
124. 141 U.S. 441 (1891).
125. Id. at 452. "[l~t is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff itself employed" the
patent which the defendant infringed. Id.
126. Id. The Court stated:
If there had been an award of damages, and the loss of trade by the plaintiff, in
consequence of the competition by the defendant, had been an element
entering into those damages, it would have been a material fact to be shown by
the plaintiff that it was putting on the market goods embodying the [patented]
invention; but as the plaintiff recovers only the profits made by the defendant
in using its business the [patented] invention, it is immaterial whether or not
the plaintiff itself employed that invention.
Id. See also Perego H, 65 F.3d at 954-55 ("The Supreme Court stated the principle over
100 years ago in Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve Co.
that, to recover for loss of trade, a patentee must prove it was 'putting on the market
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Only two post-1946 Supreme Court decisions, Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,127 and General Motors

Corp. v. Devex Corp., 28 address the issue of patent damages.' 29 Neither decision relates directly, however, to the proper measure of damages for sales of goods not protected by the patent in suit.'30 In Aro, a
plurality13 criticized the notion of the patentee's double recovery of
damages from the actual infringer and the contributory infringer for the
lost sales of goods. 132 The plurality stated that, in this case, such an
award "would enable the patentee to derive a profit not merely on unpatented rather than patented goods-an achievement proscribed..
.- but on unpatented and patented goods ... thus doubling the num-

ber of rewards to which a patentee is entitled."'' 33 In reaching this
issue, the plurality cited decisions under
the 1870 Patent Act inter34
provision.
damages
Act's
the
preting
goods embodying the [patented] invention."') (quoting Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co.
v. Consolidated Safety Valve Co., 141 U.S. 441, 452 (1891)).
127. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
128. 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
129. In Aro, the plurality relied on its pre-1946 definitions of "damages" to suggest
to the lower court on remand that the damages recoverable by the patentee should be
limited to those "sufficient to put him in the position he would have occupied had there
been no infringement." 377 U.S. at 512 (plurality) (precluding a patentee from
collecting actual damages from both a contributory infringer and a direct infringer).
In Devex, the Court found that § 284 gives district courts the power to award
prejudgment interest regardless of any exceptional circumstances. Devex, 461 U.S. at
652.
130. Aro, 377 U.S. at 510 (plurality).
131. Id. at 502, 502 n.18. Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg joined in
the damages portion of the opinion. Id. Justice Harlan considered the issue of damages
not ripe for decision. Id.
132 Id. at 503 (plurality).
133. Id. (plurality) (noting the patentee's "pecuniary position was not made one cent
worse by the total infringement to which Aro contributed"). The plurality asserted:
"The question to be asked in determining damages is 'how much had the Patent Holder
and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is] primarily: had the
Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?"' Id. at 507
(plurality) (alterations in original) (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251
F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958)).
134. Id. at 507 (plurality). The plurality cited the Court's earlier holdings under the
1870 Act as to "damages," stating:
But the present statutory rule is that only "damages" may be recovered. These
have been defined by this Court as "compensation for the pecuniary loss he
[the patentee] has suffered from the infringement, without regard to the
question whether the defendant has gained or lost by his unlawful acts." They
have been said to constitute "the difference between his pecuniary condition
after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the
infringement had not occurred."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895); Yale
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In Devex, the Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest may be
awarded even if no exceptional circumstances, such as willfulness, are
found. 31 In so holding, the Court asserted that the purpose of the pat36
ent damages statute was to afford full compensation to the patentee.'
The Devex Court noted that because the predecessor statutes did not
refer to prejudgment interest, "[t]his is not a case in which Congress
has reenacted statutory language that the courts had interpreted in a
particular way."'137 Thus, the Court implicitly acknowledged that some
38
facets of the Patent Code were unaffected by the 1952 codification.
In summary, the Supreme Court has taken the position that a
remedy for lost sales of patented goods is appropriate when all patents
are in suit and the monetary award need not be apportioned between
them. In contrast, if only one of two patents for which lost sales are
asserted is in suit, as in McCreary, or the patentee is not marketing the
39
patented invention, an award of plaintiffs damages is inappropriate.
b. Lower Court Cases

The Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving patents. 40 In addition to the Federal Circuit, lower
courts, both before and after 1982, have considered the remedies for
Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1896)).
135. Devex, 461 U.S. at 657.
136. Id. at 655.
137. Id. at 653.
138. Id. at 654.
139. In both McCreary and Crosby Steam Gage, the lower court ordered an account of
profits and damages under pre-1946 statutes, but the patentee failed to prove damages.
Specifically, in McCreary, the master also awarded no profits. McCreary, 141 U.S. at
461. In Crosby Steam Gage, the master awarded the defendant's profits. Crosby Steam
Gage, 141 U.S. at 452.
140. The Federal Circuit is the first and only federal circuit court to have national
jurisdiction over particular subject matter, including cases or controversies relating to
patents. See supra note 4; Mark J.Abate & Edmund J. Fish, Supreme Court Review of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1982-1992, 2 FED. CIRCUIT
B.J. 307, 308 (1992). Prior to its creation, patent appeals from the district courts were
heard in the regional circuits. FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS 64-65 (1994). The
Federal Circuit is explicitly bound by precedent developed in its predecessor courts, the
United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
The Federal Circuit is additionally bound by its Congressional mandate to bring
uniformity to patent law-not to create new law. See S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. I, 15. See also supra note 17 (citing
the legislative goal to have uniformity of the nation's patent laws). Therefore, it is
expected to draw from the case law developed in the regional circuits and overturn
regional precedent only when it can identify non-uniformity in the precedent. Howard T.
Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 2 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 303, 303-04
(1992).
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lost sales in two situations: (1) lost sales of goods protected by an
infringed patent and (2) lost sales of goods not protected by an
infringed patent. 141
Unprotected goods fall into two categories: (1) those which compete with the infringing goods, and (2) those whose sales depend on
or are convoyed 42 with the sale of patented goods. 143 Lost profits can
always be recovered when they result from lost sales of goods embodying the patent in suit. 44 In contrast, if the patentee does not
manufacture the claimed invention, then it traditionally 45 has not been
awarded lost profits. 4 6 In such cases, damages are limited to a
reasonable royalty. 47

141. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
142. Convoyed sales result from the sale of a patented or infringing product, but are
not the product itself. For instance, sales of parts, supplies, or accessories may be
convoyed with a patented product. See CHISUM, supra note 54, § 20.0313][vi].
143. See infra part Ii.C.2.
144. See, e.g., supra note 109 and cases cited therein.
145. This tradition began with Carter v. Baker, 5 F. Cas. 195, 207 (C.C.D. Cal.
1871) (No. 2,472), in which the court instructed the jury that plaintiffs could not recover
for lost sales of goods made under other patents. Id. at 207. 'The plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover, as a part of the damages, any loss sustained by reason of their
inability to sell . . . any other patents than those made under or embodying the patent
infringed." Id. Carter predates the Supreme Court's opinion in McCreary by 20 years.
See WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1053, at 321
(1890) (noting that damages are "to be measured by the direct and immediate evil
consequences to the plaintiff of the wrongful act of the defendant").
146. Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Postage Meter Co., 31 F.2d 459, 469 (D.
Mass. 1929) (holding that lost sales of machines not embodying the claimed invention
are not recoverable as damages); Metallic Rubber Tire Co. v. Hartford Rubber Works
Co., 275 F. 315, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 650 (1921) (affirming the district
court's finding that failure to manufacture the tire embodying the claimed feature
prevented recovery of lost sales of tires); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Comm Scope
Co., 754 F. Supp. 468, 511 (W.D.N.C. 1990); Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Service Parts,
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D. Ariz. 1980) (considering whether the patent holder
manufactured and sold goods made under the patent was an important factor in choosing
to award lost profits ).
147. Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.
1981) (excluding from award of lost profits any losses due to lost sales of unpatented
consumables, noting that "[als in so much of patent law, we observe here the tension
between the law's desire to protect the patentee and its desire to preserve competition");
Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. I11.1978).
Like the regional courts, the Federal Circuit has also affirmed that a reasonable royalty
is the appropriate measure of damages when the patentee has not manufactured goods
under the patent. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
895 F.2d 1403, 1406 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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2. Collateral Goods
The Entire Market Value Rule provides that only some sales of unpatented goods linked, or convoyed, 48 with the patented good, can be
eligible for inclusion in damage calculations. 4 9 The Entire Market
Value Rule bases an award of damages on the value of the entire apparatus, if it was purchased because of the patented feature. 50 In contrast, unpatented consumables that are sold with patented goods are
generally not included in an award of lost profits. 5 '
The Entire Market Value Rule evolved from the recognition that
sometimes a patent may cover only a small part of a machine, but
nevertheless will confer most of the value of the machine. 52 Incases
in which consumers would not buy the machine but for the patented
part, the court bases the patentee's award of damages on the value of
the entire machine. 53 If, on the other hand, the machine is almost as
valuable to consumers without the54patented part, then the court bases
the award on the value of the part.
In the case of assemblies of machines, only one of which is patented, the Federal Circuit extended the Entire Market Value Rule to
cover the entire assembly if there is "'financial and marketing dependence on the patented item under standard marketing procedures for the
148. See supra note 142 for a definition of convoyed sales.
149. See LIPSCOMB, supra note 18, § 27:35.
150. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d I1,22 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Usually, the apparatus is a single machine. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh
Buggies and Draglines, 761 F.2d 649, 655-56 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902
(1985). A group of machines sold together or convoyed, however, sometimes also
qualifies for an award of damages. Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 23 (awarding lost
profits for auxiliary units, each having separate utility, when less than 2% of the patent
holder's sales of the patented unit was for the patented unit alone).
151. Velo-Bind, 647 F.2d at 973.
152. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604,
614-15 (1912); Site Microsurgical Sys. Inc. v. Cooper Cos., 797 F. Supp. 333, 339
n.10 (D. Del. 1992).
153. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir.) (awarding lost
profits on unpatented wheels and axles as well as patented suspension), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). "The entire market value rule allows for the
recovery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several
features, when the feature patented constitutes the basis for customer demand." TWM
Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 901.
154. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1166 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). When the infringer and others sold noninfringing competing products with
success, a patentee cannot successfully argue "in effect that the noninfringing products
lacked one or more features of the patented invention and, therefore, would not be
deemed part of the market." Id.
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goods in question."' ' 55 The extent of dependence
required, however,
56
was not clearly delineated until Rite-Hite.1
As for convoyed sales of unpatented consumables or spare parts,
damages are not ordinarily 57 available for spare parts sold as part of a
package with the patented machine.' 58 The appropriateness of awarding damages for unpatented accessories is measured by whether the
patentee could normally anticipate the sale of these accessories with the
patented machine.' 59
III. DISCUSSION
After the Supreme Court decided McCrearyand Crosby Steam Gage
in 1891,60 more than a hundred years passed during which a court
never awarded lost profits for lost sales of goods that were protected
by patents not in suit, but which the patentee owned.' 6' Indeed, it appears that the patentee only rarely tried to recover such profits. 62 In
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 63 the Federal Circuit changed the law
by allowing a patentee to recover damages for such lost sales. 64 Additionally, the Federal Circuit limited the recovery of damages in convoyed sales to instances in which the unpatented component
works
6
with the patented component to produce a functional unit.
155. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22-23
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974 (Ct. Cl.
1979)).
156. See infra part lll.B.I.b.
157. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d
1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1990). "The law does not bar the inclusion of convoyed sales" of
items which lack proof of infringing content in a lost profits award. Id. (citing Paper
Converting, 745 F.2d at 23).
158. Otari, 767 F.2d at 865. "The controlling touchstone in determining whether to
include the non-patented spare part in a damage award is whether the patentee can
normally anticipate the sale of the non-patented component together with the sale of the
patented components." Id. (citations omitted). "In defining those spare parts for which
a patent owner may recover, . . . parts for such items that experience had shown might be
destroyed during the normal use of a device should be distinguished from parts which
derive their existence and value from the patent." Id. at 865-66 (citation omitted).
159. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming
the district court's denial of damages to the plaintiff on the sale of plastic wrap
convoyed with sale of machines for stretch wrapping film around boxes because the
plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to prove the connection between the two
sales).
160. See supra part II.C.l.a.
161. See supra part IT.C.1.b.
162. See supra part II.C. 1.b.
163. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
164. Id. at 1548-49.
165. Id. at 1550.
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A. The Facts and the EarlierOpinions
1. The Facts
Rite-Hite and Kelley Company dominated the market for the sale of
vehicle restraints.66 These restraints prevent trucks from inadvertently
moving away from a loading dock and causing harm to forklift trucks
or their operators. 67 The district court found that Rite-Hite had "invented and marketed two different patented vehicle restraint hook technologies, both of which achieved commercial success."' 6
The patent in suit, United States Patent Number 4,373,847 (the
"847 patent") relates to "a new approach to a vehicle locking device or
vehicle restraint for securing a parked vehicle to adjacent stationary upright structure such as a dockwall."' 169 This device marked an improvement over the earlier "pivoted hook" technology. 7 0 Rite-Hite
named its commercial embodiment
of the '847 patent the Manual Dok171
Lok-55 (the "MDL-55").

Rite-Hite also sells an automatic restraint, the Automatic Dok-Lok100 (the "ADL-100").1'7

The ADL-100 is purportedly protected by an

earlier issued United States Patent Number 4,264,259 (the "'259 patent"), which covers the pivoted
hook technology. 73 The '259 patent
174
was not at issue in this suit.

[T]he unpatented components must function together with the patented
component in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result.
All the components together must be analogous to components of a single
assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a
functional unit.
Id.
166. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1519 (E.D. Wis. 1991),
[hereinafter Rite-Hite 111], aft'd, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995).
"During the period of infringement, they [Rite-Hite and Kelley]
accounted for more than ... 95% of all vehicle restraint sales." Id.
167. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 629 F. Supp. 1042, 1047-48 (E.D. Wis. 1986)
[hereinafter Rite-Hite I], aff'd, 819 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Rite-Hite I].
168. Rite-Hite III, 774 F. Supp. at 1539.
169. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1049.
170.
The '847 device has "a vertically traveling hook assembly" which engages
trucks better than earlier "pivoted hook" designs. Id. at 1050. See infra note 188 for the
broadest claim of the '847 patent.
171. Id. at 1051.
172. Id. at 1049.
173. Id.
174. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1049. According to the United States Patent &
Trademark Office, another lawsuit filed by Rite-Hite, which has been stayed pending
resolution of this suit, asserts infringement of the '259 patent by Kelley. Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., No. 89-C-1274 (E.D. Wis., filed Oct. 10, 1989). See Rite-Hite 111,
774 F. Supp. at 1525 n.5 (stating that "Kelley had developed and was selling other
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Kelley's infringing restraints were sold under the name TrukStop.1 75 Truk-Stops were automatic restraints that competed most effectively with ADL-100s.1 76 Rite-Hite asserted that the Kelley's
automatic Truk-Stops infringed upon the '847 patent, which protects
Rite-Hite's manual MDL-55.'w Rite-Hite further asserted-that
Kelley's infringement caused lost sales of both the manual MDL-55
and, because Kelley's Truk-Stop was an automatic restraint and competed directly .with Rite-Hite's automatic restraint, the ADL- 100.178
Both Rite-Hite and Kelley often coupled sales of vehicle restraints
with sales of dock levelers, although they sold most dock levelers separately. 7 9 Dock levelers act to "automatically or semi-automatically
bridge the gap between a truck and a dock so that forklift trucks can
" 8
safely pass over that gap during the loading or unloading process. 0
Both Rite-Hite and Kelley established themselves as the dominating
competitors
in the sale of dock levelers before developing vehicle re8
straints.1 '
82
The history of Rite-Hite extended approximately twelve years1
from the filing of the suit 8 3 until the Federal Circuit finally issued its
opinion regarding damages in June 1995.184 The lower court bifur-

restraint models which Rite-Hite claims also infringe Rite-Hite patents").
175. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1051.
176. Rite-Hite i11,
774 F. Supp. at 1522.
177. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1051. Although Kelley's Truk-Stop was automatic,
the district court found it used the vertically traveling hook assembly of the '847 patent.
Id. at 1058. Kelley began selling Truk-Stops nearly a year before the patent issued. Id.
at 1060.
178. Rite-Hite 111, 774 F. Supp. at 1525-56.
179. Id. at 1530.
180. Id. at 1519.
181. Id. Both Rite-Hite and Kelley were established in the dock leveler market long
before the restraints were developed. Rich Kirchen, Despite Decade of Fightin' Words,
Rite-Hite, Kelley Deny They're Feuding, 9 BUS. J.-MILWAUKEE, § 2 at 10 (Jun. 6, 1992).
Rite-Hite and Kelley accounted for more than 80% of dock leveler sales from 1983-1990.
Rite-Hite I1, 774 F. Supp. at 1519.
182. Because the term of the patent in suit will expire May 4, 2001, the vast majority
of the patent's term has been spent in litigation. U.S. Pat. No. 4,373,847. A patent
whose validity has been questioned is a wounded patent of uncertain worth. Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Mayer, J.,
concurring). Thus, the patentee should be interested in a speedy resolution of at least the
validity issues.
183. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1049. Rite-Hite's application, filed on May 4,
1981, matured into a patent and issued on February 15, 1983. Id. The suit was initially
filed in the Eastern District of Wisconsin just five weeks after the patent in suit issued.
Id.
184. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1538.
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cated the case, determining liability in the first phase,' 85 and calculating
damages incurred by the infringement in the second phase.'6
2. The Liability Phase
In May 1985, Chief Judge Reynolds heard the liability phase of the
case in a bench trial.' 87 In the liability phase, the court found that the
Truk-Stop infringed all asserted claims of the '847 patent.'88 The
court, however, determined that Kelley's infringement was not willful,
and declined to award enhanced damages. 89. The. court enjoined
Kelley from further infringement, but stayed the injunction pending
appeal.' 0 A three-judge panel' 9' of the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment of non-willful infringement of a valid
patent.' 92

185. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1042. See infra part II.A.2.
186. Rite-Hite 11, 774 F. Supp. at 1514. See infra part 1l1I.A.3.
187. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1045.
188. Id. at 1066. The asserted claims were found to be not invalid. Id. The broadest
of the asserted claims is claim 1, which is as follows:
I. A releasable locking device for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent
relatively stationary upright structure, said device comprising
(a) a first means mountable on an exposed surface of the structure,
(b) a second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical
movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes,
(c) the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a
predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an
operative mode and in a non-contacting relation with the vehicle,
(d) and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative
mode,
(e) said second means including a first section projecting outwardly a
predetermined distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the
structure, one end of said first section being mounted on said first means for
selective independent movement relative thereto along a predetermined
substantially vertical path, and a second section extending angularly upwardly
from said first section and being spaced outwardly a substantially fixed
distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the structure,
(f) said second means, when in an operative mode, being adapted to
interlockingly engage a portion of the parked vehicle disposed intermediate to
second section and said first means,
(g) said second means, when in an inoperative mode, being adapted to be in a
lowered nonlocking relation with the parked vehicle.
Id. at 1056-57.
189. Id. at 1066. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of
enhanced damages.
190. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1067.
191. Rite-Hite II, 819 F.2d at 1120. Judges Smith, Newman, and Bissell sat on the
panel, with Judge Newman writing the opinion for the court. Id. at 1121.
192. Id.
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3. The Damages Phase
In 1990, Judge Reynolds heard the damages phase of the case in a
bench trial. 193 The district court held that Rite-Hite, as a wholesaler,
had proven damages for the sales of vehicle restraints protected by the
'847 patent, as well as for the sales of restraints assertedly protected
by an other patent and dock levelers that were convoyed with the restraints.'94 The district court also found that Rite-Hite's independent
sales organizations ("ISOs") had standing to recover damages, 95 and
for retail sales.196
that the ISOs and Rite-Hite should recover damages
97
The court then addressed the issue of damages.
Kelley conceded that Rite-Hite could recover damages for the lost
sales of goods protected by the '847 patent in suit, such as Rite-Hite's
MDL-55, and that Kelley's sales of infringing restraints could be eligible for an award to Rite-Hite of a reasonable royalty.'98 Rite-Hite,
however, claimed two other types of damages caused by its lost sales,
which Kelley contested: lost profits from the lost sales of goods protected by other patents, such as Rite-Hite's ADL-100,'99 and lost sales
of convoyed goods such as dock levelers.
193. Rite-Hite II, 774 F. Supp. at 1518.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1523. The district court held that the ISOs were exclusive licensees of the
'847 patent and thus were eligible for an award of damages. Id. The Federal Circuit
reversed, finding that the licensees were not exclusive. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
Chief Judge Archer, Senior Judge Smith, and Judges Nies and Mayer concurred in the
result. Id. at 1547. Judge Newman would have found standing for the ISOs as sales
agents of Rite-Hite and as the "principal victim[s] of the infringement, for they and
Rite-Hite sold the goods whose sales were lost due to the infringement." Id. at 1583
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
196. Rite-Hite II1, 774 F. Supp. at 1523. The Federal Circuit reversed the award for
the ISOs, holding that lost retail profits are available if the retailer owns the patent or
has the exclusive right to practice the patent within a territory. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at
1552. Thus, although the ISOs were not eligible for damages, Rite-Hite was eligible for
retail damages. Id. Judges Newman and Rader dissented, asserting that the ISOs had
standing to recover as sales agents of Rite-Hite. Id. at 1578 (Newman, J., dissenting).
197. Rite-Hite 1I, 774 F. Supp. at 1518. The total damages awarded for lost sales of
the ADL-100 and the MDL-55 at the wholesale level amounted to nearly four million
dollars, excluding prejudgment interest. Id. at 1534. The automatic Kelley Truk-Stop
directly competed with the automatic Rite-Hite ADL-100, yet infringed on the patent
protecting the manual Rite-Hite MDL-55. Id. Thus, without Kelley's infringing, RiteHite would have sold 3,243 more ADL-100 units and 80 more MDL-55. Id. at 1529. The
district court used the Panduittest to determine whether Rite-Hite had proven damages in
each of the categories considered. Id. at 1541. See supra part ll.B.2.b for the elements
of the Panduittest.
198. RiterHite I11, 774 F. Supp. at 1536.
199. Id. at 1536-37.
200. Id. at 1541-42. See supra part ll.C.2 for a review of the Entire Market Value
Rule and convoyed goods.
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The district court held that Rite-Hite could recover lost profits from
the lost sales of ADL-100 units.20' The court found that such an
award afforded "complete compensation" as required by the statute. 22
In addition, the court found that Kelley, although not a willful infringer, 2°3 anticipated taking ADL- 100 sales from Rite-Hite and thus
should have reasonably foreseen an award of lost profits on those lost
sales. 20 4 Finally, the court found that limiting the award to a reasonable royalty on Kelley's sales of the Truk-Stop would not adequately
compensate Rite-Hite. °5
The district court next determined whether Rite-Hite should recover
damages for the lost sales of dock levelers convoyed with its ADL- 100
units. 2°6 Applying the Entire Market Value Rule, the court found that
they, too, should be included in the damage award. 0 7 The court reasoned that the Rule applied "because the proper test of the entire market value rule is not whether the items have any economic value independent of the restraint, but whether the sale of levelers is highly
dependent upon the sale of restraints under the standard procedure for
marketing restraints. 208

201. Rite-Hite III, 774 F. Supp. at 1537.
202. Id. at 1540. "First, such an award of lost profits damages upholds the basic
statutory purpose underlying § 284, which is to afford 'complete compensation' for
infringement because Rite-Hite has shown to a reasonable probability that it would have
made these wholesale profits but for Kelley's infringement." Id.
203. Rite-Hite I, 629 F. Supp. at 1045.
204. Rite-Hite I1, 774 F. Supp. at 1540. "Second, such an award merely
compensates Rite-Hite for the ADL-100 sales that Kelley anticipated taking from RiteHite when it marketed the Truk Stop against the ADL-100. The rule applied here
therefore does not extend Rite-Hite's patent rights excessively, because Kelley could
have reasonably foreseen that its infringement of the '847 patent would make it liable
for lost ADL-100 sales in addition to lost MDL-55 sales." Id.
205. Id. 'Third, this rule avoids the absurd result produced by the rule that Kelley
urges. Under Kelley's proposed rule, Kelley could develop a machine to compete with
the ADL-100 by using the '847 technology contained in the MDL-55, and conversely,
develop a machine to compete with the MDL-55 by using patented technology in the
ADL-100 .

. .

. Kelley's liability would [then] be limited to reasonable royalty

damages." Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted that "if the lost profits remedy on
lost ADL-100 sales were unavailable, this court would have awarded Rite-Hite a
manufacturer's royalty equal to its lost wholesale profits on lost ADL-100 sales and lost
ADL-leveler package sales." Id. at 1540 n.22.
206. Id. at 1541-42.
207. Id. at 1542. Finding that Rite-Hite would have sold levelers convoyed with
restraints just over half the time, the district court awarded more than $1.2 million
dollars in lost profits, excluding prejudgment interest, for the lost sales of these
levelers. Id. at 1530. See supra part II.C.3 for the state of the law regarding the Entire
Market Value Rule before Rite-Hite.
208. Rite-Hite II, 774 F. Supp. at 1542.
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For some of the restraint or convoyed restraint-leveler sales, the district court held that Rite-Hite did not prove lost profits. 09 For those
sales, the district court therefore calculated a reasonable royalty from
the date the patent issued.2 '0 The court found the '847 patent to be a
pioneer patent"' with known commercial success, and that no suitable
non-infringing substitutes were available to Kelley. 1 2 Furthermore,
the court determined that Rite-Hite would not ordinarily license its patents to Kelley, its strong competitor. 21 3 The district court awarded
damages totalling $6,483,553, excluding prejudgment interest. 1 4
Kelley subsequently filed for bankruptcy. 1 5

209. Rite-Hite did not prove that Rite-Hite contacted the customer before Kelley made
the sale. Id. at 1534.
210. Id. The Federal Circuit, Judges Newman and Rader concurring, affirmed this
award. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1555.
Judge Nies dissented, maintaining that an award of a reasonable royalty based on RiteHite's lost profits, ignoring Kelley's side of the negotiation, was improper and amounted to an award of Rite-Hite's lost profits. Id. at 1576-77 (Nies, J., dissenting) (stating
that "where a patentee is not entitled to lost profit damages, lost profits may not, in
effect, be awarded by merely labelling the basis of the award a reasonable royalty"). She
noted that no licensee would have assented to a royalty which amounted to more than the
cost of Rite-Hite's manual restraints made under the patent and more than thirty times
Kelley's net profits on the entire device. Id. at 1576 (Nies, J., dissenting).
211. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining pioneer and
improvement patents).
21 2. Rite-Hite 111, 774 F. Supp. at 1535.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1534, 1536. The district court awarded prejudgment simple interest at
prime, calculated for both lost profits and reasonable royalty damages. Id. at 1543.
Rite-Hite unsuccessfully challenged the award of simple interest instead of compound
interest on appeal. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1555 (noting that the decision whether to
award simple or compound interest is largely within the discretion of the district court).
The court awarded "a royalty equal to no less than one half of the per unit profits that it
was foregoing" or $770 per restraint. Rite-Hite 111, 774 F. Supp at 1536. The total
awarded for the 502 restraints was $386,540, excluding prejudgment interest. Id. Kelley
sold the Truk-Stop for $2000 to $3000, while Rite-Hite sold the ADL-100 for $2500 to
$3000. Id. at 1529. Rite-Hite's manual dock leveler, the MDL-55, listed for one-half to
one-third of the automatic levelers. Id. at 1520.
215. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1575 (Nies, J., dissenting). The judgment was for more
than Kelley's net worth at the time of judgment. Interview with Tom Elliott, Rockey,
Rifkin & Ryther, in Chicago, I11.(October 24, 1995).
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B. The Federal Circuit CourtDecision
1. The Majority Opinion
2
The Federal Circuit 6 affirmed the district court's award of damages
for the lost sales of restraints that were not protected by the '847 patent, but which competed with restraints that infringed the patent. 1 7 In
contrast, the court reversed the award of damages to Rite-Hite for the
lost sales of levelers convoyed with, sales of restraints. 18 The court
held that the Entire Market Value Rule did not apply to the levelers, because2 the levelers and restraints did not comprise a single functional
unit. 11
Judge Nies dissented from the award of damages for competing restraints, but joined the majority's decision to refuse an award of damages for the levelers. 220 Judge Newman dissented from the majority's
decision to limit the award to directly competing goods and not awarding damages for convoy sales.2
a. Lost Profits on Goods Protected by Other PatentsAwarded
In affirming the award of lost profits on the ADL-100 restraints, the
majority noted the district court's concern with cross-competing devices.222 For instance, consider what happens if Item A competes with
Item C, but infringes a patent protecting Item D, while Item B infringes a patent protecting Item C, but competes with Item D. Under
this scenario, the district court had found that, but for a decision such
as the present one, the owner of the patents would be limited to a re-

216. The Federal Circuit decided sua sponte to hear Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1538, and
Perego IH,65 F.3d at 941, en banc simultaneously. En Banc CAFC Will Review Scope of
Lost Profits Awards, 47 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 560 (1994). Perego I
was subsequently remanded to its original three judge panel, composed of Judges Nies,
Newman and Rader, and is discussed infra notes 374-86 and accompanying text.
Amicus briefs were submitted by Grain Processing Corp., Stanley L. Amberg, Harrie R.
Samaras, and Otari Manufacturing Corp. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1541. Otar was
interested in the outcome of the Perego case, having previously unsuccessfully contested
the validity of some of the patents in suit. Otari, 767 F.2d 853.
217. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549. Judges Newman and Rader joined this portion of the
opinion. Id. at 1542.
218. Id. at 1549.
219. Id. Chief Judge Archer, Senior Judge Smith, and Judges Nies and Mayer
concurred in the result of this part of the opinion. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1575 (Nies, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
220. See infra part III.B.2.a.
221. See infra part IlI.B.2.b.
222. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546.
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covery of a reasonable royalty, which is "inconsistent
with the under' 223
lying policy of 'complete compensation.'
The court first reviewed section 284 of the Patent Code, which calls
for damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty., 224 The court interpreted this provision, as well as case law construing it, as setting a lower limit for
damage awards, but providing no specific upper limit. 225 The court
therefore applied rules derived from traditional tort law in fashioning
some limitations on the amount of damages that could be recovered.
First, the court required that Rite-Hite show that the damages were
in fact caused by the infringement. 226 That is, "but for" the infringement, the patentee would have made the infringer's sales.22 ' To determine whether Rite-Hite met this requirement, the Federal Circuit applied the Panduittest. 228 On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the
only Panduitelement in question was whether acceptable non-infringing substitutes were available. 229 Because Rite-Hite owned the patent
for the only other device available, the ADL- 100, it was not available
to Kelley as an acceptable substitute. 230 23Thus, the Federal Circuit
affirmed that Rite-Hite met the Panduittest. '
The Federal Circuit then placed a second limitation on damages by
stating that as part of establishing proximate cause, Rite-Hite must establish that Kelley could reasonably foresee that its actions would
result in lost sales.232 The court explained that such a rule was necessary, because otherwise, infinite liability for all wrongs could result
223. Id. ("Being responsible for lost sales of a competitive product is surely
foreseeable; such losses constitute the full compensation set forth by Congress, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, while staying well within the traditional meaning of
proximate cause."). See Rite-Hite I11, 774 F. Supp. at 1540.
224. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)). See supra note 81
for the text of the statute.
225. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544.
226. Id. at 1545.
227. Id.
228. Id. See supra part ll.B.2.b for the elements of the Panduit test.
229. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d. at 1548.
230. Id.
If, on the other hand, the ADL-100 had not been patented and was found to be
an acceptable substitute, that would have been a different story, and Rite-Hite
would have had to prove that its customers would not have obtained the ADL100 from a third party in order to prove the second factor of Panduit.
Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1546. "Such labels have been judicial tools used to limit legal
responsibility for the consequences of one's conduct that are too remote to justify
compensation." Id.
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from committing a single wrong.233 The court noted, however, that
patent laws did not limit damages to sales of goods covered by the patent in suit.234 While "remote consequences" caused by patent infringement, such as loss in stock value or physical harm to the inventor, are
not proximately caused by infringement,235 the lost sales of competing
goods were reasonably foreseeable and thus compensable by
Kelley.236
Therefore, because Rite-Hite would have earned its lost profits on
its competing goods but for the infringement (the infringing automatic
Kelley Truk-Stop competed with the automatic Rite-Hite ADL- 100,
which was not in suit), and because these lost sales were reasonably
foreseeable by Kelley, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
237
award of lost profits to Rite-Hite for the lost sales of the ADL- 100S.
b. Lost Profits on Convoyed Sales Limited
The Federal Circuit also clarified the application of the Entire Market
Value Rule. 238 The court noted that courts usually applied this rule
when a single device contained both patented and unpatented components, and the patented portion substantially created the value of the
device.2 39 In this case, however, the district court awarded damages
for lost sales of unpatented goods that were convoyed with patented
goods.240
Reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit found that the Entire
Market Value Rule did not apply, and that Rite-Hite could not recover
damages for the lost sales of dock levelers. 24' The court stated that the
Entire Market Value Rule applies only in cases where the unpatented
component works with the patented component to produce a functional

233. Id.
234. Id. at 1547 (noting that antitrust cases which condemn the expansion of a
patent grant to cover unpatented goods are inapposite). "The present case does not
involve expanding the limits of the patent grant in violation of the antitrust laws; it
simply asks, once infringement of a valid patent is found, what compensable injuries
result from that infringement, i.e., how may the patentee be made whole." Id.
235. Id. at 1546.
236. Id. "Being responsible for lost sales of a competitive product is surely
foreseeable; such losses constitute the full compensation set forth by Congress, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, while staying well within the traditional meaning of
proximate cause." Id.
237. Id. at 1549.
238. Id. at 1549-50.
239. See supra part I1.C.2.
240. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
241. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
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unit. The court noted that in the present case, packaging the unpatented dock levelers with the patented restraints did not create a functional unit, in part because Rite-Hite had been selling the levelers individually for years before it even developed the restraints.243
The Federal Circuit reiterated that lost sales of goods, which were
convoyed with patented goods for convenience or business advantage,
do not qualify for an award of damages. 2 " In other words, while the
court in previous decisions appeared to expand the Entire Market Value
Rule to allow damages for goods convoyed "only as a matter of convenience or business advantage,' 245 the Rule does not apply unless the
goods form a "single assembly. 246
The Rite-Hite court distinguished its award of damages for lost sales
of the competing ADL-100 restraints, which similarly were not covered by the patent in suit. 247 The court noted that the lost sales of the
ADL- 100s, however, were directly caused by Kelley's infringement of
the patent in suit. 248 The court stated that awarding those damages
satisfied the purpose of the patent law, which is to compensate for
49
losses
from infringement.
contrast,
the infringing
court explained
that theresulting
dock levelers
did not compete In
with
Kelley's
prod242. Id. at 1550.
[T]he unpatented components must function together with the patented
component in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result.
All the components together must be analogous to components of a single
assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a
functional unit.
Id.
243. Id. at 1551. "The dock levelers were thus sold by Kelley with the restraints only
for marketing reasons, not because they essentially functioned together." Id.
244. Id. The court stated that it was not persuaded that liability should extend to sales
in which the patented and unpatented components have only financial or marketing
interdependence. Id.
245: Id. at 1550 (referring to Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,
745 F.2d 11, 22-23 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
246. Id.
Our precedent has not extended liability to include items that have essentially
no functional relationship to the patented invention and that may have been
sold with an infringing device only as a matter of convenience or business
advantage We are not persuaded that we should extend that liability. Damages
on such items would constitute more than what is 'adequate to compensate for
the infringement.'
Id.
247. Id. at 1551. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
248. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551.
249. Id. "It is a clear purpose of the patent law to redress competitive damages
resulting from infringement of the patent, but there is no basis for extending that
recovery to include damages for items that are neither competitive with nor function
with the patented invention." Id.
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uct, and were "merely items sold together with restraints for convenience and business advantages." 250 The court therefore concluded that
Rite-Hite could not recover damages from the lost sales of the dock
levelers.2
2. The Dissenting Opinions
In her opinion dissenting in part, Judge Nies argued that the majority decision went too far in awarding damages for injuries to goods not
protected by the patent, but which were competitive with the infringing
good. 2 Judge Nies concurred, however, in the majority's decision to
exclude recovery for lost sales of dock levelers under the Entire Market
Value Rule.253 She asserted that she would have denied recovery
because consumers did not purchase levelers based on the demand for
the features of the restraints. 4 On the other hand, Judge Newman, in
her dissenting opinion, argued that in limiting the award to damages
relating only to restraints and not levelers, the majority did not go far
enough in awarding damages.255
256

a. Judge Nies's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Nies's dissent distinguished between the legal injury suffered
by the patentee when its patent is infringed and the amount of compensation available under the patent statute for damages caused by the infringement, whether the damages consisted of lost profits or a reasonable royalty. 57 She asserted that some injuries that satisfy the "but
for" standard are not legally compensable. 8 Specifically, Judge Nies
stated that the ability to trace economic injuries to the infringement,
such as lost sales of devices that compete with infringing goods,
would not alone establish that the injury is one which should be redressed.25 9
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 1557 (Nies, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1579-82 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256. Judge Nies was joined by Chief Judge Archer, Senior Judge Smith, and Judge
Mayer, dissenting in part. Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1557 (Nies, J., dissenting). "Patent 'damages' are limited to legal injury
to property rights created by the patent, not merely causation in fact." Id. (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
258. Id. at 1559-60 (Nies, J., dissenting). "A 'but-for' test tells us nothing about
whether the injury is legally one which is compensable." Id. at 1559 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
259. Id. at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting).
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Judge Nies disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the term
"damages," arguing that Kelley's diversion of sales from Rite-Hite's
restraints, which were not protected by the patent in suit, did not constitute "an injury to patentee's property rights granted by the... patent. ' ' 260 Judge Nies noted that these property rights were limited to "an
exclusive market in the patented goods. 26' She reviewed the common
law principles relating to damages, 262 other federal commercial tort
statutes, 263 the statutory history of section 284,26 and precedent from
before and after 1946 that related to damages to the patentee's market.265 Judge Nies determined that the patent laws were never intended
to protect products other than the patented invention being reviewed by
the court, even if they were protected by other patents.266 She therefore concluded that Rite-Hite should be allowed to recover lost profits
for lost sales of the MDL-55, which was covered by the patent in suit,
but not for the ADL-100, which was covered by a separate patent.267
In her view, this conclusion was supported by the Supreme Court's
recent mandates that to recover damages, the plaintiff must show not
only that the injury alleged is causally related to the statutory tort, but
also that the injury is of a type intended to be prevented by the
statute.268 Further, Judge Nies noted prior Supreme Court holdings

260. Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 1561 (Nies, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 1558-59 (Nies, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1559m60 (Nies, J., dissenting).
In connection with a tort created by a federal statute, the public purpose of the
statute and the likely intent of Congress are the overriding considerations
respecting the types of injuries for which damages may legally be awarded.
Courts must be careful to discern and not exceed the purpose which the
legislature intended.
Id. at 1558-59 (Nies, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Judge Nies specifically
examined Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983) (Clayton Act) and Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
503 U.S. 258 (1992) (RICO). Id. at 1559-60 (Nies, J., dissenting). See infra notes 33637 and accompanying text.
264. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1560-61, 1566 (Nies, J., dissenting). See infra part IV.A
for a review of cases cited by Judge Nies.
265. Id. at 1563-69 (Nies, J., dissenting). Many of the cases cited by Judge Nies are
reviewed infra at part V.A.
266. Id. at 1565 (Nies, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1559 (Nies, J., dissenting). In addition, under pre-1946 law, the Supreme
Court limited patent damages to those caused by the infringer's interference with the
patentee's marketing of its goods protected by the patent in suit. Id. at 1560 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
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that lost sales of goods not protected by the patent are not intended to
be protected.269
Judge Nies then examined the majority's interpretation of section
284270 of the Patent Code.27' Judge Nies asserted that "[t]he majority
construes 'adequate' as an expansive term. If anything the term 'adequate' suggests moderation, the standard definition of the term being
'reasonably sufficient,' or even 'barely sufficient.' ' 272 Judge Nies
disagreed with the majority's contention that the patent statute itself
provides no ceiling to an award of damages. 273 "[W]here infringement
of the patent interferes with that indirect benefit from the patent, the
injury has heretofore been held to be an indirectconsequentialloss and
not recoverable. 274
Judge Nies explained that there is a seemingly irreconcilable conflict
between (1) awarding lost profits when the patentee's device does not
include the patented improvement, and (2) awarding only a reasonable
royalty, not lost profits, when the patentee's device does include the
improvement, unless the patentee proves that consumer demand is
based on the patented improvement.? 5 Judge Nies maintained that the
likelihood that the demand for the ADL-100s, which were not protected by the patent in suit and with which Kelley's automatic TrukStops effectively competed, was in large part due to consumer preference for automatic, not manual, restraints. 6 Including lost profits
for the ADL-100s in the calculation of compensable damages, Judge

269. Id. at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting).
270. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See supra note 81 for the relevant section of the Patent
Code.
271. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1560. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the majority's interpretation of this provision.
272. Id. at 1560 n.7 (Nies, J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 56 (9th ed. 1983) and THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 15 (10th ed.
1981)).
273. Id. at 1560-61 (Nies, J., dissenting).
274. id. at 1565 (Nies, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1572 (Nies, J., dissenting).
The majority agrees that if a patented improvement is used in a device of the
patentee with which the infringer competes, to recover lost profits on the
entire device, the patentee must prove that the patented feature is the basis for
consumer demand for the entire product; but if the patentee substitutes other
unprotected technology for the patented improvement, then the patentee is
entitled to all of its lost profits. Surely this negates the stimulus for a
patentee to put out products with the improvement.
Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
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Nies explained, amounted to rewarding Rite-Hite for unpatented
fea7
suit.
in
patent
the
by
protected
not
features
for
tures and
Judge Nies also disputed the majority's assumption that ADL-100s
were protected by other patents. She argued that this assumption allowed the majority to assume the validity of other patents for assessing
damages relating to the '847 patent, without giving Kelley the opportunity to contest the validity of the other patents.278 If the patents were
invalid, Judge Nies reasoned, then Rite-Hite would have had no right
to exclude others from practicing those patents and thus, the ADL100s would have been acceptable non-infringing alternatives. 27 9
Because one of the purposes of the patent system is to promote the
useful arts, the patent laws provide a period of exclusivity to enable a
patentee to recoup its capital after it discloses its invention, and before
others can practice the invention.280 Judge Nies acknowledged that a
patentee is not required to practice the invention in order to receive a
patent.28' She maintained, however, that awarding lost profits on an
established product such as the ADL-100, which are normally higher
than for new products, for an infringement of a new patent, nullified
the policy of exclusivity aimed at enabling commercialization by the
patentee.282
Furthermore, because the ADL-100s are purportedly protected by
other patents, Judge Nies maintained that allowing recovery for the
lost sales of the ADL- 100s caused by infringement of a different patent
skewed the terms of the patents covering the ADL- 100s by expanding
(1) the term of patents as well as (2) the basis for protection.283 Judge
Nies noted that marking the ADL-100 with the patents under which it
is protected 2l would not put Kelley on notice of potential infringement
277. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting). Because the Truk-Stop was not alleged to
have infringed the other patents, Kelley had no chance to contest the validity of the
other patents in this case. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting). If the stayed action is resumed,
Kelley may have the opportunity to contest some of the other patents. See supra note
174. A subsequent finding of invalidity will not affect the damages awarded in this case.
Cf. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting that a previous finding of validity does not estop others from challenging
validity).
279. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting). "If those patents are invalid,
the majority's analysis collapses." Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1571 (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that the marking statute, 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(a) (1994 and Supp. 1995), provides that no damages are recoverable in the
absence of marking until actual notice is given to the infringer).
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of the '847 patent. Moreover, she asserted that marking would generate "absurd results when applied to damages tied to products not
made under the patent in suit. '286 In fact, Kelley studied the patents
that were asserted as protecting the ADL-100, in order to effectively
design around them in manufacturing the Truk-Stop. 287 Judge Nies
declared that the majority has essentially created a new rule, in which
avoiding the patents which protect a device no longer prevented the
recovery of damages for lost sales of that device. 288
289
b. Judge Newman's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Newman's dissent argued that almost any showing of
pecuniary harm related to infringement causes a compensable harm.290
Judge Newman 29' concurred with the majority in allowing lost profits
of the sale of ADL-100 restraints not protected by the '847 patent.292
She dissented, however, from the portion of the majority decision that
refused to award damages for lost convoyed sales of levelers, packaged with the restraints, under the Entire Market Value Rule.293 She
reasoned that, if the levelers and restraints were bid and sold in packages, then the sale of packages that include infringed restraints caused
actual damages in lost sales of the whole package.294 Thus, Judge

285. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting). Judge Nies also pointed out that Rite-Hite couldn't
"mark its ADL restraints with notice of the '847 patent," because it would constitute
false marking in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292. Id. (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
286. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
287. Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1052. At the time the Truk-Stop was first available
for sale, the patent was still a year from issuance. Id. at 1049, 1053.
288. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1571 (Nies, J.,dissenting).
289. Judge Rader joined Judge Newman's dissent. Id. at 1578 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290. Id. at 1578 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She stated:
In holding that those injured by the infringement shall not be made whole, the
value of the patent property is diminished. The majority's half-a-loaf award,
wherein the patentee and the other plaintiffs are denied recovery of a
significant portion or all of their proven damages, is an important policy
decision.
Id. (Newman, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29 1. Judge Newman was the author of the initial Federal Circuit opinion affirming the
district court's finding of infringement. Rite-Hite 11, 819 F.2d at 1121. Judges Smith
and Bissell comprised the rest of the panel. Id. Judge Bissell was no longer on the
bench by the time the appeal on damages was decided. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1542. Judge
Smith joined Judge Nies's dissent. id. at 1556.
292. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1578 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
293. Id. at 1578 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
294. Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Newman did not agree on the basis for which the damages should be
awarded.295
In concluding that lost sales of levelers should be included in calculating damages under the Entire Market Value Rule, Judge Newman
began by reviewing damages principles.296 After reviewing the leading cases 297 and the leading hornbooks, 298 she concluded that the question should not have been whether the restraints and levelers sold in
convoyed sales had separate, independent functions, 299 but whether
the unpatented levelers depended financially and in marketing on the
sales of the patented restraints, whether protected by the patent in suit
or by other patents. 300 She found that, in this case, Rite-Hite proved
that the sales of levelers depended on the sales of restraints, and that
Rite-Hite should therefore have been allowed to recover for the lost
sales of levelers.30 '

295. Id. at 1578-79 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
296. Id. at 1579 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The basic principle of damages law is that the injured party shall be made
whole. On the facts on which the district court awarded damages for certain
lost sales of dock levelers, the relationships were direct, causation was
proved, the scope of recovery was narrow, and the circumstances were unusual.
Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
297. Id. at 1579-81 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Newman cited, inter alia, General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983);
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964); Del Mar
Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instruments, 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paper
Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d II (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Lam
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Id. (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1580 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Newman cited, inter alia, FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (2d
ed. 1986); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987); and CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1985).
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1580 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1582 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "The correct question is not whether the infringing truck restraint was part of a
larger combination whereby the truck restraint could not function without the dock
leveler, or whether the truck restraint or the dock leveler also had an independent market
and use." Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"[lit is not the physical joinder or separation of the contested items that
determines their inclusion in or exclusion from the compensation base, so
much as their financial and marketing dependence on the patented item under
standard marketing procedures for the goods in question." The sales of dock
levelers and truck restraints met this criterion.
Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Leesona Corp. v.
United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979)).
301. Id. at 1581-82 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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IV. ANALYSIS

By awarding lost profits on the sale of goods not protected by the
patent in suit, the Federal Circuit ruled contrary to the Supreme Court
decisions Seymour, McCreary, and Crosby Steam Gage, which instructed courts that a patent owned by the patentee must be assumed to
be available to an accused infringer unless that patent is adjudicated
valid in the same case.3 °2 These cases, although decided under earlier
statutes, use the same meaning for damages as the current statutes, because Congress has not shown any intent to change the meaning of
damages in enacting either section 284 or its predecessor statutes.30 3
Indeed, the Supreme Court continues to rely on its interpretation of
patent damages before the 1946 amendments in its post-1946 cases.
The 1946 amendments merely eliminated from damages calculations
the infringer's profits, and added pre-judgment interest to damages calculations.3 °5
On the other hand, the Rite-Hite majority sensibly created a bright
' 3°6
line limitation of damages to items that "constitute a functional unit.
This limitation harkens back to the requirement that the patentee establish that the patented feature is demanded by the buyer before it can be
awarded lost profits. 307 Applying this rule, if the unpatented item does
not function with the patented item, then it is properly ineligible for
any award of damages.30 8
This latter portion of the majority opinion reflects the tension between the desire to preserve free competition and the desire to protect
the patentee: 3°9 If goods that are convoyed with patented goods are not
eligible for damages, then why should goods that do not contain the
patented feature, and are not sold with goods containing the patented
feature, be eligible for damages?

302. See supra part II.C.l.a.
303. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 80.
306. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550 (declining to extend liability to items having
"essentially no functional relationship to the patented invention"). See supra part
I1.B.2.
307. See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1458-59
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that the failure to show a changed market share of patentee or
infringer while practicing the patent is probative of buyer's apathy toward patented
advantage).
308. See supra note 246.
309. See supra notes 147 and 249.
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A. Lost Profits Incorrectly Allowedfor Goods Not ProtectedBy
PatentIn Suit
In Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee may recover lost
profits resulting from lost sales of goods protected by some patent in
its portfolio diverted to goods in competition with these patented goods
and infringing another patent, even if the infringer has no opportunity
to contest the patent's validity, once the patentee proves that infringement caused the lost sales.310 In this case, the infringer, Kelley, successfully designed around Rite-Hite's previously issued patents, and
manufactured an automatic restraint which competed with Rite-Hite's
automatic restraints.3 1' Unfortunately, Kelley infringed a patent that
would not issue until nearly a year after its devices reached the market.312 Rite-Hite's manual restraints were protected by the claims of
this later patent. 31 3 As a result of this infringement, Rite-Hite proved
lost sales of eighty manual restraints and about 3200 automatic restraints.314 Because Rite-Hite had protected both types of restraints
with patents, and because Kelley had competed for the customers of
the automatic restraints, the Federal Circuit incorrectly concluded that
Kelley should be required to compensate Rite-Hite for "lost sales of a
competitive
product," stating that such a result is "surely foresee31 5
able.1
The mere foreseeability of lost sales should not have been enough to
justify an award of lost profits. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the patent damages statute instructs that a patentee should be
fully compensated for infringement,3 6 the statute directs that this compensation should be "adequate., 317 As Judge Nies argued in her dissent, "adequate" does not require an expansive reading, but rather
means "reasonably sufficient" or "barely sufficient., 31 8 This compensation should be, like that afforded to patentees who have been harmed
by the United States government's infringement, no more than

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
31 8.
§ 1498
United

Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550-51.
Rite-Hite I11,
774 F. Supp. at 1522.
Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1060.
Rite-Hite 111, 774 F. Supp. at 1520.
Id. at 1525.
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546.
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983).
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See supra note 81 for the text of the statute.
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1560 n.7 (Nies, J., dissenting). Compare with 28 U.S.C.
(1994) (directing an award of "reasonable and entire compensation" when the
States infringes a patent).

1996]

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.

705

"reasonable and entire., 3'9 The Federal Circuit has exceeded what is
"reasonable" in its quest to fully compensate patentees.
Significantly, Rite-Hite had another remedy available for the injury
caused by Kelley's sales of patented goods, namely, a reasonable royalty. The reasonable royalty was not recognized until after the turn of
the century. Previously, harm done to a patentee who neither sold
nor licensed an invention could only be remedied by a nominal
award. 32' The availability of the reasonable royalty militates against
expanding the award of lost profits to cover goods not protected by the
patent in suit, because a patentee's failure to exploit the market for the
patented goods no longer results automatically in an award limited to
nominal damages.322
In concluding that lost sales of a competitive product are foreseeable
and thus compensable, the Federal Circuit failed to consider the Su32 3
preme Court's instructions in McCreary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co.
that a patentee cannot recover damages for goods protected by a patent
not in suit. 324 Not only did the Federal Circuit fail to reconcile
McCreary, the Rite-Hite opinions failed to even cite McCreary.3 1 The
McCreary decision predates both the recognition of the reasonable
327
royalty 326 and the abolition of the award of the infringer's profits.
Its holding, however, should be controlling, because in that case the
Supreme Court stated that predicating any sort of monetary award to
the patentee for a patent that is not in suit, and which is owned by the
patentee, is unacceptable, in part because the infringer has no opportunity to challenge its presumed validity.32 8 The Supreme Court
319. See supra note 82 and .accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 69-70, 74-76, and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
322. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1566 (Nies, J., dissenting). See Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) (holding that a
contributory infringer should be liable only for nominal damages when a direct infringer
is already liable for substantive damages).
323. 141 U.S. 459 (1891). See supra part Il.C.I.a. for a discussion of the Supreme
Court opinions on this issue.
324. McCreary, 141 U.S. at 465. See supra part II.C.l.a.
325. McCreary has been cited in only three reported cases since the D.C. Circuit cited
it in Smith v. Kingsland, 178 F.2d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See Pursche v. Atlas
Scraper & Eng'g Co., 300 F.2d 467, 480 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911
(1962); Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 568 F. Supp. 319, 326 nn. 22-23

(S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Federal Tel.
& Radio Corp. v. Associated Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 F. Supp. 535, 542-43 (D. Del. 1951).
These cases, as did earlier cases, cited McCreary for its discussion of double-patenting.
326. See supra note 74.
327. See supra note 74.
328. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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has more recently acknowledged, in instructing the Federal Circuit 3to
29
decide validity if it is challenged-even if no infringement is found,
that rewarding a patentee for a device which is not patentable is anomalous.3 30
As Judge Nies correctly acknowledged in her Rite-Hite dissent, the
Seymour and Crosby Courts also instructed the Federal Circuit that
damages caused by patent infringement should be limited to sales of
the actual goods embodying the patent invention, whether these sales
are the patentee's (in which case lost profits are appropriate), or the in331
fringer's (in which case a reasonable royalty may be appropriate).
When the patentee cannot demonstrate that it lost sales of the patented
goods because of the infringement, the court should turn to a reasonable royalty as an adequate measure of damages.
The Devex Court's requirement that the patentee receive "full" compensation does not contradict this instruction.332 Consideration of
analogous federal tort law indicates that the Rite-Hite majority misunderstood the meaning of full compensation. The Supreme Court has
stated that intellectual property statutes providing for recovery in trademark 333 and copyright 33 4 contexts must be strictly construed. 335 The

Court has considered damages under federal law in other commercial
tort contexts, including the Clayton Act 336 and the Racketeer Influ329. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1977 (1993).
330. "'Although recognizing the patent system's desirable stimulus to invention, we
have also viewed the patent as a monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the
economic consequences attending other monopolies. A patent yielding returns for a
device that fails to meet the congressionally imposed criteria of patentability is
anomalous."' Id. at 1977-78 n.24 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 342-43 (1971)).
331. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1563-64 (Nies, J., dissenting).
332. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983).
333. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967)
(noting that "in the Lanham Act, Congress meticulously detailed the remedies available
to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed"). The
Fleischmann Court held that attorney fees under the 1967 version of the statute were not
available because "[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly
provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily be
implied." Id. at 720. The Lanham Act was subsequently amended in 1975 to provide for
recovery of attorney fees. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
334. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 408 (1940) (limiting
recovery to the profits "attributable to the use of the copyrighted play"). The Sheldon
Court noted that apportionment of profits in such a copyright case is analogous to
apportionment of profits in "cases in which the plaintiffs patent covers only a part of a
machine and creates only a part of the profits" under the pre- 1946 Patent Act. Id. at 402.
335. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 721.
336. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 533 (1983). The private damages section of the Clayton Act, § 4, was origi-
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enced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").3 37 A common thread
uniting these analyses is a strict reliance on both the language of the
statutes and the common law interpretation of the words within the
statutes. The Federal Circuit sidestepped these instructions and incorrectly decided that the award of lost profits for competing goods fell
within the statutory remedy of the patent statute.
The lower court decisions also indicate that an award of lost profits
relating to competing goods is improper. Until Rite-Hite, the courts
had instructed patentees that they must be manufacturing goods, and
that those goods must embody the claims of the patent, in order to be
awarded lost profits. 338 Rite-Hite removed that obstacle to recovery.
As Judge Nies noted, the requirement that a patentee must be a manufacturer to recover lost profits reflects Congress' intent to encourage
the patentee to exploit the patent after disclosing the invention.339
Judge Nies's position that lost sales of goods not protected by the
patent in suit are not the type of injury Congress intended to be
remedied by the patent statutes contrasts with the majority opinion.
The majority sidestepped the requirement that the injury be legally
compensable by deciding that if the injury were foreseeable, then it
must be compensable.34 '
nally enacted in 1890 and provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor...
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). In Associated Gen. Contractors,
the Court took into account the common law background of the antitrust damages statute
in determining that the statute should not be interpreted literally to allow recovery of
damages for every harm. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533. "Congress
simply assumed that antitrust damages litigation would be subject to constraints
comparable to well-accepted common-law rules applied in comparable litigation." Id.
337. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). The
damages provision of RICO reads: "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). In Holmes, the Court, noting the similarity between this language and the Clayton Act damages provision, held that Congress
did not intend the RICO damages provision to be interpreted literally, but rather intended
that the violation be both a "but for" cause and a proximate cause of the injury. Holmes,
503 U.S. at 268. In defining "proximate cause," the Court stated that the elements included a "direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged."
Id. at 259. The Court noted that anything less would be "simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can generally
be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general." Id. at 269-70.
338. See supra part II.C.I.b.
339. See supra note 282.
340. Compare supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text with notes 222-37 and
accompanying text.
341. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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Even if the determination of whether an injury is compensable was
limited to whether it is foreseeable, mere competition should not be the
measure of foreseeability. Although patent law provides for damages
relating to patents not practiced, the damages were measured by a reasonable royalty, in which the interests of both parties are weighed.34
Additionally, patents that are practiced are eligible for damages only if
the infringer received constructive or actual notice. 3 3 After Rite-Hite,
the risk is increased for competitors because they not only must avoid
practicing the patents which are being used in the marketplace, but
must search out and avoid practicing patents which are not being used
by others.344
Finally, the implications of a court's ability to award damages for
harm done to the sale of goods protected by a patent not in suit are
significant. As Judge Nies noted, the accused infringer has no opportunity to contest the validity of the other patent when there are no allegations that it has been infringed.345 If that patent were invalid, then
the Panduitanalysis would collapse because those goods become acceptable non-infringing substitutes." Indeed, McCreary indicates that
such a patent must be considered to be available to the infringer.347
B. The Entire Market Value Rule Was Correctly
Limited to FunctionalUnits
The Federal Circuit correctly held that the facts of Rite-Hite prevented the patentee from recovering its lost profits on sales of unpatented goods not functionally related to the patented goods. 348 In clarifying the holding of Paper Converting Machine Co. v. MagnaGraphics Corp.,'34 9 by requiring more than financial convenience or

342. See supra part II.B.2.a.
343. See supra note 284.
344. See Perego I, 65 F.3d at 941 (awarding lost profits "regardless of whether the
patent owner has made, used, or sold the patented device"); see also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at
1571 (Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that infringement of an unmarketed patent now may
result in the patentholder being rewarded for not marketing the invention).
345. Id. at 1573 (Nies, J., dissenting).
346. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
347. McCreary, 141 U.S. at 467. The McCreary Court pointed out that awarding
damages relating to a market protected by another patent would assume, inter alia, that
the other patent was valid. Id. This assumption could not be tested in a suit which did
not concern the other patent. Id. at 465.
348. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549.
349. 745 F.2d II (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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marketing convenience,350 the Federal Circuit provides a brighter line
for calculating damages on convoyed sales.3"'
Prior to Rite-Hite, the Entire Market Value Rule had been extended
beyond the traditional consideration of a single machine, of which only
a portion was protected by a patent, to include physically separate
components when they were part of an assembly or functional unit. 5
The Federal Circuit appeared to expand the rule in PaperConverting
by stressing the "financial and marketing dependence" of the two types
of components; 3 3 however, the Rite-Hite court limited that apparent
expansion to the facts of that case, by interpreting that case to imply
that the unpatented components had "no useful purpose independent of
the patented [component]. 354
In Rite-Hite, patented restraints, which prevent trucks from inadvertently leaving the loading dock, were packaged or convoyed with
unpatented levelers, which bridge the gap between the loading dock
and the truck. 5 The market for levelers predated the market for restraints by many years. 35 6 Kelley sold unpatented levelers with infringing restraints about 45% of the time,357 while the patentee in
Paper Converting made similar convoyed sales about 98% of the
time.358 Thus, the Federal Circuit purported to have set no new limits,
but it could have distinguished PaperConvertingby finding that RiteHite failed to show that the sales of levelers really depended financially
on the sales of restraints.359 Instead, the Federal Circuit went one step
further in declaring that the patented and unpatented components must
comprise a single assembly or a functional unit in order to be eligible
for an award of damages under the Entire Market Value Rule.3 6
This clarification was both necessary and legitimate because an
award of damages for items which are neither patented nor functioning
350. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
35 1. See infra notes 352-63 and accompanying text.
352. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549-50 for a discussion of the evolution of the rule.
353. Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22-23.
354. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550.
355. See Rite-Hite ii, 774 F. Supp. at 1519, 1530.
356. See Rite-Hite 1, 629 F. Supp. at 1047.
357. See Rite-Hite II, 774 F. Supp. at 1530 (stating that of 3825 infringing
restraints, 1692 were sold in conjunction with levelers).
358. See Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 23 (noting that of 572 sales, only 9 were not
convoyed).
359. The Federal Circuit could, for instance, have decided that Rite-Hite's assertion
that only 45% of its sales were linked was insufficient to meet the burden of proof for
financial dependence, especially when the leveler market predated the restraint market
by decades. See supra note 181.
360. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550.
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with patented items falls outside any construction of the patent damages statute. 36 1 The limitation does, as Judge Nies notes, seem to con-

flict with the majority's affirming the award of lost profits for sales of
competing devices not protected by the patent in suit.3 62 If articles

which are bought because they happen to be packaged or ordinarily
purchased with patented articles were included as part of the damages
calculation, then one could imagine absurd results. Should Rite-Hite
be awarded for lost sales of levelers (convoyed with restraints not embodying the patent in suit) which had an independently
developed mar363
ket years before restraints were invented?
V.

IMPACT

Because the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent cases,
the Federal Circuit has essentially become the court of last resort for
patent appeals. 3' Therefore, the Rite-Hite decision has effectively become the law of the land and is unlikely to be overturned in the near
future.
The Rite-Hite decision will broaden the scope of recovery for patentees with large patent portfolios beyond anything dreamed of in the
two hundred years of patent protection in the United States. Allowing
the recovery of damages for lost sales of goods not protected by the
patent in suit deprives the accused infringer of its day in court, while
allowing the patentee to unlawfully extend the term and scope of protection of its patents. 365 An infringer is now responsible for lost sales
of goods protected by potentially invalid patents with no mechanism to
invalidate these patents .3' Litigation will become more complicated as
every marketed technology protected by patents which might compete
with the technology at hand will be asserted as resulting in lost sales to
the infringer.3 67

361.
362.
363.
364.
granted

Id. at 1551.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277.
See Abate & Fish, supra note 140, at 307 n.1 (noting that the Supreme Court
certiorari in only 19 of 586 petitions covering all topics originating from the

Federal Circuit's first seven years). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to only four
cases relating to patents between 1982 and 1992. Id. at 330.

365. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
367. See Perego ii, 65 F.3d at 941, 951 (Nies, J., dissenting). In Perego I1, Judge
Nies in dissent posited that, under such a scope of damages, a patent "hangs like the
sword of Damocles over competition," and, further, could even be used as a means of
extortion. Id. at 959 (Nies, J., dissenting).

19961

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.

An accused infringer will have to consider the entire patentee's portfolio relating in any way to the accused item in determining the stakes
of pursuing litigation or settling, whether before or after infringement
is found.36 An accusing patentee will have to survey its portfolio for
all related patents and determine the measure of the market. What will
be the limitations of competing goods? The Federal Circuit indicates
that the relevant market is to be "broadly defined., 369 Will the battle
over the relevant market
definition be as protracted as is now the case
370
for antitrust cases?
Even the district court opinion has already influenced other courts.
In Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co.,37' the district court cited RiteHite in allowing Gillette to seek to prove lost profits caused by lost
sales of products covered by a second patent not in issue.372
Judge Nies, in her dissent, noted that litigation regarding lost profits
will increase, referring to another case "already waiting in the
wings. 373 This case is King Instrument Corp. v. Perego,"4 which
was taken en banc the same day that Rite-Hite was taken, but remanded to its original three-judge panel after Rite-Hite was issued.375
As in Rite-Hite, King proved lost sales of goods competing with infringing goods. 3 76 Unlike Rite-Hite, King was not practicing the in368. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
369. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546. Cf id. at 1569-70 (Nies, I., dissenting) (objecting
to a market that was more broadly defined than that "for the invention in which the
patentee holds exclusive property rights").
370. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380
(1956) (disputing whether market was for cellophane or flexible packaging materials).
"Every manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular commodity it makes but its
control in the above sense of the relevant market depends upon the availability of
alternative commodities for buyers ... ." Id.
371. 788 F. Supp. 439 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
372. Id. at 444. The district court in Scripto-Tokai held that the patentee was entitled
to prove lost sales and price erosion of its rubber-based erasable ink pens due to the
accused infringer's sales of erasable ink pens using other technology patented by the
patentee. Id. The patentee never sold erasable ink pens using the infringed technology.
Id. at 440.
373. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1578 n.24 (Nies, J., dissenting).
374. 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
375. Patents: Damages, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 251 (July 13,
1995). The decision below was King Instrument Corp. v. Perego, 737 F. Supp. 1227 (D.
Mass. 1990) [hereinafter Perego I]. Oral arguments were heard by a three-judge panel
comprising Judges Nies, Newman, and Rader in August 1991. Perego 1I, 65 F.3d at 945.
The Federal Circuit issued a sua sponte en banc order twenty-nine months later in January
1994. Id. After the opinion in Rite-Hite was issued, Perego I was returned to the
original three-judge panel. Id. Judge Rader wrote the opinion for the court, with Judge
Nies dissenting in part. Id. at 943.
376. Perego II, 65 F.3d at 947. King owned three patents directed to loading audio or
video tape into closed cassettes which Perego assertedly infringed. Perego 1, 737 F.
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fringing patent and thus could give no constructive notice to infringers
of the existence of the patent. 377 Nevertheless, the district court awarded King its lost profits because its goods were purportedly protected by other patents.378 While the Federal Circuit affirmed, Judge
Nies again dissented, stating that the Perego opinion expanded the
Rite-Hite opinion even further by holding that "a patent owner who
has suffered lost profits is entitled to lost profits damages regardless of
whether' 37the
patent owner has made, used, or sold the patented
9
device.

,

Judge Rader, writing for the majority, reviewed the history of the
patent act, noting that exploitation of the invention is not necessary to
recover damages, 380 and the policy of the patent act is "[t]o promote
the Progress of... useful Arts."38 ' The majority asserted that awarding lost profits in a fact situation in which the patentee did not sell
goods falling within the claims of the infringed patent promotes this
policy. 382 Judge Nies relied on her Rite-Hite dissent in asserting that
"[a] patent grants the patentee a legal right to a protected market only
383
for patented goods.,
The proof of damages will be pushed to the limit as well, with only
the assurance that falling stock prices and heart attacks are not foreseeably related to the act of infringement. 38 Judge Nies declared that
the King majority improperly affirmed an award for lost profits when
the patentee did not even sell a counterpart to the infringed part.3 85
That the Federal Circuit is willing to extend Rite-Hite so far so quickly
suggests that it will be lenient in defining competitive products for the
purposes of measuring lost profits. The scope of patent protection for
Supp. at 1229. Perego was found to infringe only one patent, a patent which King did
not practice at all. Perego II, 65 F.3d at 947.
377. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) (stating that notice of patent on the product is required
to collect damages).
378. Perego 1, 737 F. Supp. at 1241. The "machine may be covered by other extant,
expired or invalidated patents in King's portfolio." Perego iI, 65 F.3d at 954 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
379. Perego Il, 65 F.3d at 947.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 949 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8 cl. 8.).
382. Id. at 950.
383. Id. at 954 (Nies, J.,dissenting). "The court has now twice declared that the
remedy Congress has provided of damages calculated as a reasonable royalty are
inadequate and judicially fashions a better one for patentees which conforms to the
majority's view of the public interest." Id. at 953 (Nies, J.,dissenting).
384. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546. The Rite-Hite majority explicitly listed these two
events as unforeseeable. Id.
385. Perego I1,65 F.3d at 961 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
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competitive products is thus extended and broadened with no clearly
delineated limits.
In contrast, the limits placed by the Federal Circuit on the Entire
Market Value Rule may reduce the uncertainty of patent litigation. By
restricting damages to sales of goods which are functioning units
instead of referring to marketing and financial dependence, the Federal
Circuit has limited compensable damages to ones which are more readily foreseeable and easier to justify. A recent decision by the Federal
Circuit suggests that the sale of unpatented spare parts may satisfy the
functional unit test.386
VI. CONCLUSION

In Rite-Hite, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ignored
Supreme Court precedent and improperly expanded the damages for
patent infringement recoverable by a patentee to include lost profits
from the sale of goods not covered by the patent in suit. With this
decision, the Federal Circuit has pushed the envelope of damages
available under section 284 of the Patent Code beyond the scope intended by Congress and dictated by the Supreme Court in McCreary v.
Pennsylvania Canal Co. The court also wrongly characterized RiteHite as a matter of first impression.
On the other hand, the court did provide some valuable guidance as
to the damages recoverable for the convoyed sales of goods packaged
as a single unit under the Entire Market Value Rule. By limiting the recovery of damages for the sale of packaged goods under the Entire
Market Value Rule to those goods constituting a single "functioning
unit," the court has ensured that a patentee will not wrongfully recover
sales lost of unpatented goods which were sold with patented goods
for convenience.
LISA C. CHILDS

386. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction precluding the future
sale of spare parts when the district court had found that the patentee had proven
entitlement to lost profits for the past sale of these spare parts. Id. at 882. The Federal
Circuit further clarified the term of art "convoyed sales," explaining that it is preferably
used to describe "sales made simultaneously with a basic item." Id. at 881 n.8. Noncontemporary sales, such as the later sale of spare parts here, are better referred to as
"derivative sales." Id. Carborundum did not cite Rite-Hite.

